In a significant policy shift, Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signalled an openness to restoring relations with Syria, stating “there is no reason not to establish relations with Syria”. This statement marks a departure from Turkey’s previously confrontational stance since the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011.
After cutting ties with Syria during the civil war, Turkey supported various opposition groups against President Bashar al-Assad and conducted several cross-border military operations. These operations led to the occupation of areas previously populated by Kurds, displacing the local population and resettling the areas with Arabs in order to create a ‘safe zone’ under Turkish control.
Erdoğan’s recent statements reflect a new willingness to engage diplomatically with Assad, provided that Syria cooperates with Turkey’s campaign against Kurdish forces, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which have established a degree of autonomy in northern Syria following their successful fight against ISIS.
Kurdish communities in northern Syria are alarmed by the potential rapprochement. Turkish military operations have already displaced many Kurds, and any Turkish-Syrian cooperation against the SDF could further undermine Kurdish autonomy. Dr Samira al-Moubayed, a Syrian politician, criticised the rapprochement as a move to stifle Syrian aspirations for political change and maintain dependence on Turkish-backed opposition groups.
“The Turkish government’s efforts to meet with Bashar al-Assad’s regime or invite it to Ankara with the Russian president are aimed at stifling the Syrian revolution and preventing political change in Syria,” she said. Al-Moubayed further stressed that this approach could lead to the stagnation of the country’s development, to the detriment of all Syrians, adding, “Bashar al-Assad may be willing to trade Syrian sovereignty for power, but the Syrian people’s refusal to give up their rights and lands prevents this alignment.”
Ibrahim Hamidi, a commentator on Middle Eastern affairs, highlighted the complexity of Turkish-Syrian relations, noting Turkey’s significant military presence in northern Syria and its hosting of millions of Syrian refugees:
“In recent years, Russian President Vladimir Putin has said he wants to help bring his ally, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, in from the cold. Diplomatically, this means facilitating normalisation between al-Assad and the Arab world, and between al-Assad and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.” He pointed out that any progress is complicated by Turkey’s military control over parts of Syria, stressing that “the Turks will only withdraw when everything is in place”.
Hamidi noted that the mediation efforts of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani and Russian envoy Alexander Lavrentiev appear to have produced a compromise. The Syrians are dropping their precondition of a Turkish withdrawal, while Ankara is dropping its demand for a political solution as a precondition for withdrawal. This development represents a major diplomatic breakthrough. “Now a breakthrough seems to have been achieved, which would mark a significant shift,” he remarked.
Hamidi addresses the importance of the fear of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in narrowing the gap between Turkey and Syria amid concerns over a permanent Kurdish presence in northern Syria. “Today, both Ankara and Damascus are convinced that the Kurdish institutional presence—particularly the Autonomous Administration in North and East Syria—poses an existential threat to their unity and territorial integrity,” Hamidi concludes.
“Ocalan’s shadow shrinks the gap between #Turkey and #Syria”
Ibrahim Hamidi writes in #AlMajalla ✍️ @ibrahimhamidi https://t.co/HF5FkCebXZ pic.twitter.com/9CwSbPqnE1
— Al Majalla (@AlMajallaEN) July 10, 2024
Fadi al-Shammari, political advisor to the Iraqi prime minister, highlighted Iraq’s role in preparing for the Damascus-Ankara talks, stressing that a rapprochement between Syria and Turkey is in Iraq’s direct interest. This includes securing borders, economic cooperation, reducing the influence of armed groups and facilitating the return of Syrian refugees. “Baghdad benefits from playing the role of mediator in several ways, including enhancing regional stability, which has a positive impact on the security and economic situation in Iraq,” he explained.
Erdoğan’s shift towards Syria mirrors a similar change in policy towards Egypt. After years of hostility, Erdoğan shook hands with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in 2022, signalling a thaw in relations. This pragmatic approach reflects Erdoğan’s broader foreign policy strategy.
Protests in Turkish-controlled cities in northern Syria following Erdoğan’s comments underscore the contentious nature of this potential normalisation. The London-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported clashes between protesters and Turkish forces, with casualties. Members of the Free Syrian Army expressed anti-Turkish sentiments, and Turkish flags were destroyed in symbolic acts of defiance.
The evolving Turkish-Syrian relationship represents a pivotal moment in the geopolitics of the Middle East. As Erdoğan navigates this diplomatic U-turn, the future of Kurdish aspirations in northern Syria remains uncertain. The region is watching closely, aware that the outcome will not only reshape Turkish-Syrian relations, but also determine the fate of Kurdish communities and broader regional dynamics.
