Sharing details of their meeting with Abdullah Öcalan, lawyer Özgür Erol emphasised that presenting political and legal solution options for resolving the Kurdish issue would lead to a paradigm shift in Turkey.
The İmralı Delegation of the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party held a third meeting with Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan at İmralı island prison on 27 February. During this meeting, Abdullah Öcalan, alongside the delegation members and fellow prisoners Ömer Hayri Konar, Hamili Yıldırım and Veysi Aktaş, made a historic statement from prison.
The appeal titled “Call for Peace and Democratic Society” has opened the door to a new era. As discussions surrounding this call continue to resonate worldwide, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has also issued a statement affirming their support for it.
Since August 2019, Abdullah Öcalan had been completely prevented from meeting with his lawyers, a severe violation of his legal rights. However, on 27 February, for the first time in over four years, he established contact with one of his lawyers as part of a larger delegation from the DEM Party. This meeting, marked by Öcalan’s call, has reignited discussions on the possibility of a new reconciliation process in Turkey.
With this historic moment, expectations are rising that Öcalan will be freed from absolute isolation and regain access to legal representation. There is also growing debate on legal amendments related to the right to hope—a provision required by the Council of Europe (CoE) for all member states to ensure a path to release for those serving aggravated life sentences. The CoE’s Committee of Ministers has set a deadline for Turkey to implement this legal amendment by September 2025, reinforcing its obligation to comply with human rights standards.
Despite these legal obligations, Turkey has continued to deny Öcalan’s right to hope, keeping him in prolonged isolation. Now, with a political shift and increased international scrutiny, the prospect of legal reform has emerged as a critical factor in determining whether Turkey will pave the way for Öcalan’s release and a new phase of dialogue in the country’s Kurdish policy.
Among those who travelled to İmralı Island was Faik Özgür Erol, a lawyer from Asrın Law Office, who had met with Abdullah Öcalan twice in 2011. Erol shared details of the meeting, key points from the historic statement, and subsequent developments with Mezopotamya Agency (MA) on Friday.
You had previously met with Abdullah Öcalan. Before discussing the details of the meeting and the points emphasised in the appeal, how did you feel upon learning that you would be allowed to meet with your client again after so many years?
There has been a long-standing and serious public demand and struggle for an end to the isolation system in İmralı Prison and for Mr Öcalan to be given conditions where he can express himself. Politicians, prisoners, patriotic communities [the Kurdish diaspora] in Europe, the Kurdish people, and their allies both within Turkey and internationally have all voiced demands and fought for this. I believe this process is closely linked to these efforts. It is the result of accumulated persistence and determination. Naturally, the recent developments also represent the culmination of these aspirations. When we learned that we would be taking part in this meeting, we felt the weight of all these accumulated hopes. I cannot deny the tension and excitement it brought. On the one hand, there was a deep sense of excitement and the human longing to reunite after so many years. On the other hand, there was the responsibility of carrying all these expectations and ensuring they were properly represented. We faced the challenge of being worthy of this responsibility. With all these emotions, we set out for the meeting.
How did you prepare before the meeting?
We have always approached meetings at İmralı Prison with a certain level of preparation. Firstly, we prepare by gathering information about the legal situation and the prison’s living conditions. Secondly, we consider the key issue of access to the outside world and the challenges of communication beyond the prison walls. We also go in with knowledge and perspectives on regional and international developments. This time, our preparations followed a similar pattern.
However, we also anticipated something specific. The same had happened in 2019. After such a long period of interruption, we expected that Mr Öcalan would approach the meeting with his own deep reflections and preparedness. I personally understood that our primary task was to reflect his thoughts accurately and to focus on understanding him correctly.
After the preparations, you came together with the expanded delegation. What was the prevailing mood, and what was discussed?
Everyone was very excited. People were looking into each other’s eyes and smiling. I noticed that very clearly. The other members of the delegation included our party leaders, fellow delegation members, and friends who had taken on many responsibilities and burdens. Despite this, the sparkle in their eyes was unmistakable. There were also some who were meeting for the first time, and their excitement was different. Perhaps they had only known about this from what they had been told or had heard up until now. This was also the case for [DEM Party] Chairman Tuncer (Bakırhan) and Chairwoman Tülay (Hatimoğulları).
Was there any particular statement that caught your attention?
There were gestures reflecting the excitement, but let’s not go into too much detail about them for now.
Where and how did the prison administration receive you on the island?
There is a certain level of experience and expertise that comes from previous meetings, both within our delegation and among the officials on the other side. They welcomed us with courtesy outside the prison. Similarly, upon entering the prison but before reaching the meeting area, we were hosted for a while in the warden’s office. There, they offered refreshments. A conversation and exchange of views took place, including a brief discussion about the conditions and situation there.
What did they share with you?
They mostly responded to our delegation’s questions. For example, we asked about the food—where it is prepared—whether there are opportunities for production within the facility, and whether there is any settlement on the island. Their responses mainly addressed these specific, personal curiosities. The conversation took place within a framework of mutual courtesy and continued in that manner.
Did they share any information regarding Abdullah Öcalan and the conditions of the other prisoners there?
Mr Öcalan resides in a three-room unit—the same rooms they were assigned between 2013 and 2015. There is a section he uses for sleeping, another with a bookshelf and workspace where he has a desk and chair, and a third area used for exercise. As far as I am aware, the other inmates are accommodated in single-room units. During the day, they are allowed access to the courtyard at set times. According to what the warden told us, they can also gather for an hour of sports or social activities five or six days a week.
How did Abdullah Öcalan and the other prisoners receive you? What can you share about this reception?
That moment is always the most emotionally intense. The first moment is always the most critical and exciting one—during every meeting and every gathering. Mr Öcalan had arrived at the meeting room before us and greeted us standing. He shook hands with each person individually and showed personal attention to everyone. As I mentioned before, he showed particular care towards Ahmet Türk, engaging with him more closely. There was already a special rapport from previous meetings with our delegation members. He remembered Cengiz (Çiçek) and me from the past as lawyers. He invited us to take our seats, and once we sat down, the other friends—Hamili Yıldırım, Veysi Aktaş and Ömer Hayri Konar—arrived. When they came in, we stood up again to greet them and embraced. At that moment, while Cengiz and Hamili were greeting each other, Mr Öcalan turned to Cengiz and said, “It’s like greeting Seyit Rıza, isn’t it?”
Mr Öcalan and the other prisoners sat on one side of the table, while we, the delegation members, sat on the other. Mr Öcalan and Ahmet Türk sat directly across from each other, and the meeting took place in this manner.
Were state officials present during the meeting?
Yes, they were there. They observed. If there was a topic concerning them or a question directed at them, they responded.
Did Abdullah Öcalan share anything about İmralı? About isolation or health conditions?
From past experience, we know that Mr Öcalan tries as much as possible not to talk about his health and conditions. He prefers to dedicate the meeting time, down to the very last minutes and seconds, to discussing social, political and societal issues. So, in the past, we had to insist on getting such information from him. However, this time was different—it was a meeting aimed at making a statement, and the delegation was large. That meant we didn’t really have the opportunity to ask questions about the conditions there, nor was there a chance to do so. Mr Öcalan had already come with his own agenda, and he guided the discussion towards those topics without allowing for anything else.
I can add this: at times, we could sense the severity of the conditions from some of the things he said. After the main part of the discussion related to the [peace] call had concluded, we all had a lunch together.
During that lunch, there was a bit more room for personal conversations. At one point, when he mentioned, “I’m thinking of writing something,” one of the delegation members asked, “What if we came here for a while and stayed with you to help?” He laughed and replied, “You wouldn’t be able to withstand the conditions here.” He had previously referred to İmralı, saying, “This place requires great determination and willpower.” I found that meaningful.
The place where we held the meeting was on an upper floor. As we were coming down after the meeting, one of the prisoners struggled a little while descending the stairs. I immediately asked another friend, “Why?” They replied, “This is the first time in 10 years he has gone down a flight of stairs.” Ten years of walking only on flat ground. Being forced to live under the same conditions continuously…
What did he say about the statement?
There had already been a long and serious period of preparation for this call. He had begun outlining its framework some time ago—both in his meeting with Ömer Öcalan and in subsequent discussions with delegation members. In fact, when he arrived at the meeting, he was holding a three-page handwritten document. As soon as he sat down, he said, “Yes, this is a historic day.” He stated that we were in a historic meeting. “Now, we need to give this a name,” he said. He reflected on it for a moment and then decided: “The word ‘peace’ must certainly be in this text. At the same time, this is a call directed towards a democratic society. That must also be included. Then, let’s call it the ‘Call for Peace and a Democratic Society.’” He immediately finalised the name, and from there, he began reading the text to us. However, as he read, he paused at certain paragraphs to clarify: “Here, I mean this” or “What I intend to say here is this.”
Did you determine the seating arrangement?
We arranged it together. Some of us moved to the back to create a sense of depth in the framing.
Sırrı Süreyya Önder shared that Abdullah Öcalan told the delegation: “Undoubtedly, the practical abandonment of arms and the dissolution of the PKK require the recognition of democratic politics and legal frameworks.” Was this statement read on camera?
To put it in one sentence: it was part of the call. The seating was arranged, and Mr Öcalan began reading the text while being recorded on video. Many photographs were taken as well. He read the text in its entirety. Once he finished, he verbally added the sentence in question. This particular sentence had already been discussed during the meeting. The handwritten text had been agreed upon a day or two prior, sent to the necessary official bodies, returned and finalised. Later, Mr Öcalan made it clear that this phrase was already embedded in the meaning of the text. He said, “This phrase is within the text; the text already conveys this meaning. However, we may need to emphasise it in a more explicit sentence to avoid any ambiguity.” Discussions took place with officials present. Since rewriting the handwritten text in time was not feasible, it was agreed that this sentence would be added verbally after the text was read. This is how it was done. During the recording, he read the full text first and then added the sentence. In fact, after that, he himself started clapping, and we joined in.
The statement included the phrase: “The inevitable consequence of extreme nationalist deviation—separate nation-states, federations, administrative autonomy and culturalist solutions—fails to address historical societal sociology.” What did Öcalan share with you about this section?
These emphases should not be seen as issues that have only recently emerged. They are present in the defences for the ECHR he wrote in İmralı nearly 20 years ago, particularly in the fifth volume. They are topics he has discussed at length. As a result of his collectivist worldview, he developed an analysis of the state. While identifying the three pillars of capitalist modernity, alongside industrialism and capitalism, he also included the nation-state. He has long analysed these as the fundamental causes of many crises, wars, and acts of genocide. Therefore, these are not newly introduced perspectives.
The term “culturalist solutions” here does not refer to the denial of cultural rights. That would be a highly incorrect and misleading interpretation. What is being referred to are certain formulas developed within the framework of postmodern theory, using minority-majority discourse, which do not possess the real capacity to resolve the fundamental issue. That is how I understand it.
The real issue is how cultural differences can be brought together within a shared space of coexistence—how they can be transformed into something that enriches rather than divides. His analyses describe the Kurds as a foundational co-constituent of the [Turkish] republic. Essentially, the Kurds are being reintegrated into the republic through a legal framework. If I recall correctly, he made this observation during his lawyer meetings in 2019 (1). Beyond this, he has extensive analyses on local democracy and self-expression at the local level. As Mr Öcalan’s ability to directly express himself expands, I believe we will have better access to these ideas.
Now, this one-and-a-half-page document is the foundational text of this process. Moving forward, the in-depth analyses he has conducted for each paragraph of this text must be shared with both society and the broader structure, including Turkish society. We can try to convey them as best as we can. We can attempt to express them. However, what truly matters is that he presents them himself. That is how they will find their true meaning.
Before the call, Abdullah Öcalan had said, “I possess the necessary competence and determination to contribute positively to the new paradigm strengthened by Bahçeli and Erdoğan.” Is there a new paradigm in question?
A paradigm shift signifies a comprehensive systemic change. Let me put it this way: the peaceful and dialogue-based resolution of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, along with the renewal of democratic politics and legal frameworks accordingly, would undoubtedly constitute a paradigm shift for Turkey.
Is this the core message being conveyed?
A fundamental departure from the politics of denial that began in 1924, the recognition of Turks and Kurds as equal members of society alongside all other social groups, the introduction of political and legal solutions to the Kurdish issue, and progress in this direction would indeed amount to a paradigm shift for the Republic of Turkey.
Returning to the message that was not included in the text—are there specific expectations or points Abdullah Öcalan has concretely emphasised as necessary?
We need to develop correct and new concepts in this matter. This is crucial for the healthy progress of the process. It is also closely related to the language of this period. The text itself emphasises the language of this period. Instead of concepts that provoke, are laden with ambition, or have acquired different connotations over time, we must find and use terms that are more forward-looking and resistant to distortion. This is a responsibility that undoubtedly falls upon all parties involved, including ourselves.
Therefore, rather than saying, “This is expected from that side, this side must do this, and the other must do that,” I believe it would be more appropriate at this stage to identify the necessities of this period and assess to what extent they have been implemented. Of course, this is something that must be pursued alongside efforts to explain and persuade society. That is one aspect of the matter.
When we talk about the political framework, this call makes a very clear choice in favour of democratic politics. The choice and preference have been made in that direction. There is a common saying: “Politics and arms cannot coexist.” This has been one of the most frequently repeated phrases in recent times. Fine—arms and democratic politics cannot go hand in hand. Likewise, Mr Öcalan has also made his choice in favour of politics.
So, how will this political space be created? How will a violence-free political process and a framework for democratic politics be established? There are necessary steps that must be taken to achieve this. For instance, ideological, ethnic/national, and religious-sectarian identities and their modes of self-expression collectively constitute the realm of freedom of expression. The democratic political space should not impose restrictions on identities and must include safeguards to prevent violations of freedom of expression. Over time, it will be possible to determine what else is needed through mutual exchange of ideas.
A serious vision for change and transformation is being put forward. Will there not be a corresponding legal framework? The primary expectation from a democratic legal foundation is precisely this.
What are the necessary legal measures?
I would like to explain this point with an example given by Mr Öcalan. He began by speaking about the Özal era (2) and said:
“When Özal reached out to us at that time, he did so by taking very serious risks—even putting his life on the line. In fact, that process cost him his life. Most of the reforms emerging today were actually initiated by Özal. Before even engaging in dialogue with us, he introduced a conditional amnesty law and released many PKK members from prison. A few years later, Erbakan also established a dialogue with us. There were exchanges of letters. Back then, Erbakan was proposing a five-year political ban for us, saying, ‘After five years, you can participate in the political process.’ In response, we tried to reciprocate these initiatives with ceasefires. However, for various reasons and due to counteractions, these processes were derailed.
Then, in 2000, I took a step myself. I made a call: all forces should withdraw beyond the borders. I made this call, and some tried to exploit it as an opportunity to strike while they had the chance. Would it have been the end of the world if, at that time, a single law had been enacted? [On the contrary,] this process could have been resolved back then.”
Now, serious calls are being made. A serious vision for change and transformation is being put forward. Will there not be a corresponding legal framework? Can the absence of one be expected? This is the first crucial dimension of the matter—particularly the primary expectation from a democratic legal foundation.
The second dimension concerns the viability and implementation of this process. We identify three key actors influencing the process. One of them is Mr Öcalan. However, compared to the others, he is in a highly disadvantaged position—even under conditions of imprisonment. Is it possible for him to manage this process in the most effective, comprehensive and feasible manner under such conditions? There needs to be a level of balance in this regard.
How is this possible?
At the initial stage, it is crucial to swiftly ensure the freedom to work and communicate without restrictions. There is also a solid legal basis for this: the ‘Right to Hope’ ruling, which provides a clear legal foundation. A regulation grounded in this ruling could be enacted, and implementing it would take only four or five days.
There are two main justifications for this. The first is that Mr Öcalan is addressing a very broad structure—one that extends across countries, regions and even continents. There are many communities linked to this structure, and he has a responsibility to communicate with, persuade and explain things to all of them. This is a necessity.
The second is that since as early as 1992, every process he has attempted to develop has faced internal and external interventions aimed at obstructing, undermining or derailing it with provocations. In his last meeting, he assessed such developments and described them as a ‘strategic coup’. Normally, he would use terms like ‘coup’, but in this meeting, he specifically referred to a ‘strategic coup’. To protect the process and ensure that he can accurately articulate its framework, his ability to work and express himself freely must be guaranteed. This constitutes the second dimension of the democratic and legal framework. The first step that needs to be taken is precisely this. Once this step is taken, the remaining necessities for the process will naturally emerge and become clearer through the dialogues, negotiations and relations he engages in—both from his side and in dialogue with the other parties involved.
President Erdoğan has also mentioned the mechanism of a coup in some of his statements. Is there a coup mechanism working against the process? Did Abdullah Öcalan provide any details about this?
He is trying to understand this—whether such a possibility exists, how strong it is, and how to analyse and resolve it.
Were the trustee appointments and arrests brought up?
Last week, the İmralı Delegation visited South [Iraqi] Kurdistan. The visit began on 15 February, and on the very morning of that visit—coinciding with 15 February (3)—a trustee was appointed to Van (Wan) Metropolitan Municipality. Is this correct? Similarly, other trustee appointments, the arrests in İstanbul, and the detentions and operations targeting the HDK [Peoples’ Democratic Congress]… These are all significant indicators that must be considered.
Since 2009, we have accumulated experience regarding these processes. Talks began in 2009, and immediately after, the KCK [Kurdistan Communities Union] operations (4) were launched. Between then and 2013, while negotiations continued on one hand, operations on the other hand turned the process into complete chaos, making it impossible to navigate. If we do not want a repeat of that, then of course, measures must be taken.
Currently, lists containing thousands of names are circulating in the media and on social platforms in connection with these arrest operations. The scale of these operations is causing concern, and a significant number of the names appearing in those lists are Turkish. Of course, there are also Kurds among them. Now, if we are going through such a process, does it not need to be explained to Turks just as much as to Kurds? And who is best positioned to explain this process in the most comprehensive and well-grounded manner to the Turkish public? Is it not precisely the HDK components? Is there any logic in carrying out an operation against this very entity at such a critical time?
Therefore, these issues must be considered carefully. However, beyond these domestic developments, the approaches of various regional and global powers must also be closely monitored.
The PKK has declared that it supports the call and will convene a congress. They have also stressed that security concerns must be addressed for the congress to be held and that Abdullah Öcalan should lead the congress. What was discussed regarding the PKK congress?
This is directly tied to the ability to work freely and express oneself without restriction, as I described earlier. He must be able to address and persuade the Kurdish people, the Kurdish patriotic masses and even Kurds in other regions regarding this process. He must also be able to communicate with his own associates, speak to them and explain the process to them. He has a desire to do so, and there is also a necessity for it.
Their (PKK’s) response to the call is highly significant. They are standing firmly by Mr Öcalan in a very consistent manner. For the same reasons discussed earlier, establishing direct communication channels with Mr Öcalan is essential.
What does it mean for a lawyer to be part of the delegation visiting İmralı?
The presence of a lawyer, a legal expert, in the delegation underscores that this matter is not solely political but also has a legal aspect. This is precisely why I found it particularly significant. When I expressed this to Mr Öcalan in this way, he told me that it was absolutely correct.
At this historical moment, major developments are unfolding, and in this critical and turbulent period, Kurds and Mr Öcalan are expected to take a historic political stance—just as has happened in past Turkish-Kurdish historical sociology. But under what legal framework will this be done? What is the legal identity and status of the Kurds? Under what legal conditions will Mr Öcalan fulfil his role? Of course, law is not independent of politics, and precisely because of this, the most political processes inevitably include a legal dimension as well.
Will the delegation visit İmralı again? Did Abdullah Öcalan say anything about this?
We explained that the conditions in İmralı need to change, and with this in mind, visits must continue regularly. However, this should not be limited to just us. Families must also be able to visit. Lawyers must be allowed to visit. The existing delegations should continue their visits. Other delegations should also be possible—for instance, civil society organisations could form a delegation, women could form a delegation, and other political parties should be able to visit for political consultations.
Beyond delegations, journalists must be allowed to go. They should be able to ask their questions directly and receive answers firsthand. Anyone with questions about this process, anyone with ideas, or anyone who seeks clarity should have the opportunity to meet and discuss.
What plans or programmes do you have for the coming days?
I hope that in the coming days, within a short period, some meetings will take place. The next steps of the process should be scheduled in a clear timeline, and according to that timeline, work will continue.
Interview by Mezopotamya Agency’s Mehmet Aslan and Selman Güzelyüz
Translation by MedyaNews
Explanatory Notes
(1) The 2019 meetings (2 May, 22 May, 12 June, 18 June, 7 August) involved Öcalan addressing hunger strikes and proposing a legal-political framework for the Kurdish issue, including local democracy. This framework revolves around several key principles emphasising democratic politics, local democracy, constitutional guarantees and societal participation. These principles include:
Democratic political resolution and honourable peace: Abdullah Öcalan emphasised a solution through democratic politics, advocating for an honourable peace rather than continued conflict. He stressed that Kurdish and Turkish identities are interdependent, arguing that the weakening of the Kurds would also lead to the weakening of Turkish identity and influence in the region. This vision extends beyond Turkey, highlighting how Turkish-Kurdish cooperation could serve as a foundation for peace and democracy in the Middle East.
Constitutional and legal reforms for a democratic solution: Öcalan called for constitutional recognition and legal reforms to ensure the democratic rights of Kurds and other communities. He underlined that democratic transformation could only be achieved through the participation of the entire society, not just elite decision-making.
Democratic negotiation and civil struggle: He criticised traditional political structures, including tribalism and clan-based politics, as obstacles to real democratic governance. He advocated for civil, peaceful and intellectual methods of struggle, referring to non-violent resistance models like that of Mahatma Gandhi. The development of democratic negotiation mechanisms and the use of cultural, political and intellectual power were seen as essential tools for achieving change.
Local democracy and the role of decentralisation: A key aspect of his proposal was local democracy, particularly in Syria and Turkey. He stressed that a political structure guaranteeing local governance should be constitutionally secured, particularly in Syria, where he saw the Kurdish-led administration (AANES or the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, also known as Rojava) as a model for broader democratisation. He argued that Turkey and Syria’s domestic and foreign policies were interconnected, making regional democratic governance a necessity.
“Right to life” and opposition to self-destructive tactics: He rejected hunger strikes and self-destructive actions as the primary means of struggle, promoting instead a “politics of life” centred on constructive engagement rather than ‘martyrdom’. He drew parallels with historical figures, such as Hallaj Mansur, to illustrate the importance of pursuing truth and justice despite oppression.
(2) The “Özal era” refers to the tenure of Turgut Özal, Turkey’s Prime Minister (1983–1989) and President (1989–1993), marked by economic liberalisation and a pragmatic approach to the Kurdish issue. Özal, of partial Kurdish descent, initiated dialogue with the PKK and advocated for cultural rights, laying early groundwork for political-legal solutions to Kurdish integration within the Turkish Republic. His policies foreshadowed later discussions on local democracy and coexistence, themes echoed in Abdullah Öcalan’s 2019 analyses and the 2025 İmralı meeting’s call for a “Peace and Democratic Society.” See: Zürcher, Erik J., Turkey: A Modern History (I.B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 278–285; Barkey, Henri J., and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 67–70.
(3) 15 February holds significance primarily because it marks the anniversary of the capture of Abdullah Öcalan. On 15 February 1999, Öcalan was arrested in Nairobi, Kenya, in an operation involving Turkish intelligence (MİT) with reported cooperation from international intelligence agencies. He was subsequently brought to Turkey, where he was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment. Since then, 15 February has been a day of protests, demonstrations and political statements, particularly among Kurdish movements and supporters of Öcalan, who refer to it as the “International Conspiracy” against the Kurdish movement. It is often marked by protests, rallies and calls for Öcalan’s release in various parts of the world.
(4) KCK operations are a series of investigations and arrests that have been going on since 2009, alleged to be targeting the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), but in effect servings as means of eliminating Kurdish political figures in Turkey through incarceration. Although the Turkish courts have accused the suspects in all cases of partaking in illegal groups, no verdict has yet been issued on the basis of any evidence.
