Sinan Önal
As Turkey marks its centenary, the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has launched an audacious rhetorical shift. In October 2024, the ruling coalition, bolstered by its ultra-nationalist partner the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), announced a “normalisation process”. This initiative invited Kurds to participate in shaping Turkey’s “second century”, a striking departure from the nationalist policies that have defined Erdoğan’s rule in the past decade.
Devlet Bahçeli, the longstanding leader of ultra-right government partner MHP extended a public invitation for Abdullah Öcalan to address the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) as part of a prospect political reconciliation initiative on 12 October, including proposals for legal amendments to grant Öcalan ‘the right to hope’ for eventual freedom.
Amidst this backdrop, Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned Kurdish leader, made a rare public intervention on 28 December 2024. Meeting with MPs from the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party after nearly four years of isolation, Öcalan presented a vision for reconciliation based on peace, democracy, and Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood. Öcalan’s seven-article message was forwarded to TBMM President Numan Kurtulmuş and MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli on 2 January. Further consultations with opposition political parties like the Republican People’s Party (CHP), as well as the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), are expected to follow on 6 January and in the days thereafter. Öcalan’s seven-article message was both hopeful and laden with scepticism. For many, it evokes memories of previous overtures that led to unfulfilled promises and deepened mistrust.
The year 2025 could mark a historic transformation for Turkey and the region—if genuine efforts are made to address the Kurdish question. However, the shadow of a decade of brutal repression, ethnic conflict, and state violence complicates the path forward.
A decade of repression and its legacy
The past ten years have been a dark period for Turkey’s Kurds and its broader opposition. Following the collapse of the 2013-2015 peace process, Erdoğan’s government initiated a systematic campaign to silence dissent and dismantle Kurdish political structures. This campaign rivals some of the harshest and most oppressive eras of state violence against Kurdish uprisings. Terms like “sarı torba” (yellow death bag) and “terroristan” (terror country) have emerged as grim symbols of the government’s genocidal policies over the past decade.
To briefly remind for the readers, I can explain each of them as Sarı torba (yellow death bag) which refers to the body bags used to transport the remains of Kurdish guerrillas and activists, symbolising the Erdoğan government’s dehumanising rhetoric and policies toward the Kurdish opposition. And for the Terroristan, it was produced as a derogatory term employed by Erdoğan and his allies to describe Kurdish regions in North Iraq and Syria, portraying them as havens for terrorism to justify military aggression and delegitimise Kurdish autonomy efforts.
Pro-Kurdish political representatives, particularly members of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), faced arrests, harassment, and imprisonment. Kurdish mayors were removed from office and replaced with government-appointed trustees, erasing local democratic representation. Tens of thousands of Kurdish activists faced imprisonment or were forced into exile.
Militarily, the Turkish state expanded its operations against Kurdish forces both within its borders and abroad. In northern Syria, Turkey invaded and occupied Kurdish cities such as Efrîn, Serêkanîye, and Girê Sipî. These operations, often justified as counter-terrorism measures, displaced thousands of civilians and drew accusations of ethnic cleansing. Reports of chemical weapon use against Kurdish fighters in the mountains further underscored the extremes of state violence.
These actions were not limited to Kurdish fighters. Civilian massacres, cultural suppression, and the systematic erosion of Kurdish linguistic and educational rights created a pervasive sense of alienation. For many Kurds, the promise of equality and coexistence in Turkey remains elusive.
Öcalan’s vision for peace, democratisation and resolution
Against this backdrop of repression, Abdullah Öcalan’s 28 December statement offered a radically different vision. Described as optimistic and forward-looking by the DEM Party delegation, Öcalan emphasised the importance of Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood, parliamentary engagement, and democratic transformation.
“The era of peace, democracy, and brotherhood is upon us,” Öcalan declared. He urged all political actors to transcend narrow, short-term calculations and embrace constructive dialogue through Turkey’s TBMM. For Öcalan, this reconciliation is not merely a domestic necessity but a regional imperative, particularly amidst ongoing instability in Gaza and Syria.
His message reflects the principles of his long-standing paradigm, democratic confederalism. This model envisions a decentralised system of governance built on grassroots democracy, gender equality, diversity in unity based pluralism and co-existence, ecological sustainability, and a non-exploitative societal economy. In stark contrast to Turkey’s current centralised and authoritarian structure, Öcalan’s ideas provide a blueprint for addressing deep-rooted grievances while building a more inclusive society.
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The contradictions of normalisation
Despite the hopeful rhetoric of reconciliation, the contradictions in the government’s approach are difficult to ignore. How can a regime that spent the past decade systematically dismantling Kurdish rights and institutions now position itself as a champion of peace and inclusion?
The timing of this normalisation effort raises suspicions. Internationally, Erdoğan faces mounting isolation. Turkey’s exclusion from projects like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) underscores its diminishing role on the global stage. Domestically, grassroots movements advocating for women’s rights, minority protections, labour justice and democratisation have gained momentum, further challenging Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule.
For many observers, the government’s engagement with Öcalan and the Kurdish question appears less a moral reckoning and more a strategic calculation aimed at regaining legitimacy. The ultra-nationalist MHP, a long-time partner in Erdoğan’s coalition, has publicly embraced these gestures, including a symbolic handshake between MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli and Kurdish MPs. Such moments, while monumental, have been met with widespread scepticism among Kurdish communities.
Geopolitical dynamics and the Kurdish Question
The Kurdish issue cannot be disentangled from the broader geopolitical shifts transforming the Middle East. In recent years, the Abraham Accords, the containment of Iranian influence, and the stabilisation of conflict zones like Syria have signalled a new regional order.
Turkey’s marginalisation in these developments reflects the consequences of Erdoğan’s erratic foreign policy, which has strained relations with both Western allies and regional powers. Resolving the Kurdish question, however, offers Ankara an opportunity to reposition itself within this evolving landscape. A democratic and inclusive Turkey could play a pivotal role in fostering regional stability, aligning with Western priorities while addressing domestic grievances.
Öcalan’s statement acknowledged this context, framing reconciliation as not only a national imperative but also a regional opportunity. However, achieving this vision requires a shift from symbolic gestures to substantive reforms.
A roadmap for reconciliation
As 2025 begins, it is evident that a realistic roadmap for a genuine resolution to the Kurdish question must include several key steps:
1. Ending Öcalan’s imprisonment: Providing Öcalan with regular access to legal counsel, family, political representatives, journalists, and NGOs, international press and delegations, followed by his eventual release, is vital for transparency and trust-building. The global campaign advocating for the release of Abdullah Öcalan and a political resolution to the Kurdish question, which began in October 2023, has garnered significant attention worldwide. This movement included the calls of many Nobel laureates and has highlighted his harsh conditions of detention, including 44 months of incommunicado confinement and 26 years of absolute isolation on İmralı Island. Öcalan’s democratic confederalist philosophy underscores the urgent need for his freedom and the initiation of political dialogue for not only for Turkey but the larger region’s transformation towards democracy and peace. This campaign is pivotal in raising awareness and demanding justice for Öcalan’s situation.
2. Creating a parliamentary platform: The TBMM must become a space for open, inclusive dialogue that addresses Kurdish demands and broader democratic reforms.
3. Engaging civil society: Kurdish grassroots movements, women’s organisations, and local councils must play an active role in shaping the reconciliation process.
4. International oversight: Western allies and human rights organisations must hold Turkey accountable for its commitments, ensuring that this process moves beyond political rhetoric.
5. Halting military operations against Kurdish guerrillas: Turkey must cease its military campaigns targeting Kurdish guerrillas within its borders and in northern Iraq. These operations have caused significant civilian casualties, destabilised the region, and perpetuated cycles of violence. A unilateral ceasefire, paired with mediated negotiations, is essential to create conditions for peace.
6. Ending aggressions and conspiracies in North and East Syria: Turkey must immediately halt its attacks on and conspiracies against the Kurdish-led administration in Rojava. The continued military aggression undermines regional stability, disrupts governance structures, and exacerbates humanitarian crises. Respecting Rojava’s self-governance and fostering dialogue could pave the way for cooperative regional relations to the extent of building a decentralised and democratic new Syria.
The convergence of grassroots demands for democratisation and geopolitical realignments creates a unique opportunity for transformation. Yet, without genuine commitment from all stakeholders, this moment risks becoming yet another missed opportunity.
The road ahead for building bridges
Abdullah Öcalan’s 28 December message has reintroduced the possibility of reconciliation at a time of immense political and social tension. His vision of peace, democracy, and brotherhood offers a transformative path forward, not only for Turkey but for the broader Middle East.
As Turkey has already entered its second century, the stakes could not be higher. The question now is whether Turkey can transcend its authoritarian past and embrace the democratic aspirations of its people—or if this moment will dissolve into another cycle of broken promises and deepen divisions.
At this historical juncture, Öcalan’s vision, rooted in participatory democracy, women’s liberation, and ecological harmony, offers a transformative blueprint for reconciliation. As geopolitical shifts reshape the Middle East and grassroots democratic movements gain momentum within Turkey, 2025 presents a rare alignment of forces pushing for change. For Erdoğan and his ruling elite, this is a moment of reckoning. For Kurds and other oppressed communities, it is a cautious moment of hope and freedom as the final result of their continuous struggles. And lastly, for the international community, this moment underscores that justice and peace demand not just vision but sustained action, accountability, and robust support for grassroots movements, coupled with measures that either deter violations or encourage reforms.
*Sinan Önal is a political scientist, currently an envoy of the Kurdistan National Congress and a contributor of Medya News. He formerly acted as an adviser in policy-building and international affairs to the left-wing alternative and pro-Kurdish parties DTP, BDP, and HDP in Turkey. Mr Önal also represented the pro-Kurdish party in the United States and Germany.
