The latest Medya News interview features an in-depth discussion with Meghan Bodette, the Research Director of the Washington D.C.-based think tank, the Kurdish Peace Institute. This institute provides research and policy recommendations on Kurdish struggles from sociopolitical, cultural, and geostrategic perspectives, recently expanding its presence with a new office in Qamishli (Qamişlo), North and East Syria.
In this exclusive interview, Bodette shares her insights on the evolving US policy towards the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) under the new Trump administration, addressing key regional and international dynamics. She examines whether Washington’s approach will continue or shift under Trump’s transactional foreign policy style, especially in relation to Turkey.
US policy and the SDF alliance
Medya News asked Bodette what shifts could be expected in Washington’s approach to the SDF and broader Kurdish policy. She responded that the US will likely recalibrate its policy, not necessarily due to the new administration but because of changing conditions on the ground. She highlighted that the US aims for a stable Syria that does not become a haven for ISIS or a threat to regional stability. While Trump’s approach remains unpredictable, she noted, “Preventing a Turkish invasion appears to be a US interest as well. We’re seeing from the US support for and maintenance of a ceasefire with Turkey along the Euphrates that stability in the region is paramount. The US policy direction also includes fostering inter-Kurdish engagement between Iraqi Kurdistan and northeast Syria and even, in tacit ways, supporting renewed efforts to resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey.”
US withdrawal rumours and Trump’s Middle East strategy
Addressing concerns over a possible US withdrawal from North and East Syria, Medya News asked whether such a move aligns with Trump’s broader strategic vision. Bodette warned that a withdrawal without a political settlement could lead to “a revival of ISIS, further Turkish aggression, and the restart of Syria’s civil war, which following the fall of Assad, the international community and certainly Syrian people on the ground have celebrated as ending.” She further explained, “US policymakers know, just as other regional actors and international actors know, that further Turkish intervention would revive ISIS and restart the Syrian civil war, making a Turkish-Kurdish peace regionally impossible for another generation. This is an outcome that many actors are keen to avoid.”
The future of North and East Syria
When asked about the role of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) in Syria’s reconstruction, Bodette emphasised its governance model based on pluralism, religious freedom, and gender equality. “Their inclusion in any political settlement is essential,” she stated, “not only for the protection of communities in the northeast but also for ensuring a long-term resolution to the Syrian conflict. The current HTS-led government is actively seeking international legitimacy and investment, yet it lacks the foundational stability and inclusive governance approach that the AANES has demonstrated. The AANES has consistently been a partner of choice for the international community in countering ISIS, and that presence strengthens their position in negotiations.”
Turkey’s role and US positioning
Medya News also inquired about Turkey’s opposition to Kurdish-led political structures. Bodette noted that resolving the Kurdish issue in Syria is tied to broader transnational Kurdish dynamics. “If the Turkish government walks away from the process again, as they did in 2015, we are likely to see renewed instability that will affect Syria and beyond,” she warned. “But there are signs of a shift—ceasefires have been enforced before Turkey launched major offensives in the region, international mediators have been increasingly involved, and diplomatic efforts between Syrian Kurdish and Iraqi Kurdish leadership are being encouraged. This suggests that there is growing recognition that Turkey’s militarised approach is a long-term liability rather than a solution.”
IMEC and changing geopolitical alliances
Regarding the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and its impact on Turkey’s regional role, Bodette explained that Turkey’s sidelining presents both challenges and opportunities for Kurdish actors. “With the shift towards a more multipolar system, Kurdish political actors have new avenues for diplomacy beyond the traditional power blocs,” she observed. “Turkey has long leveraged its strategic position between East and West to extract concessions from both sides, but as new corridors and alliances emerge, that leverage is being tested. This provides Kurdish political structures with an opening to explore creative and flexible alliances with emerging global powers.”
Geopolitical shifts and US decision-making
With increasing tensions between Washington and Ankara, Medya News asked how this could affect US engagement with North and East Syria and the Kurdish issue. Bodette suggested that the shift in US posture towards great power competition means it has an interest in de-escalating conflicts in the Middle East. “For the US to pivot towards its broader strategic goals, regional stability is necessary. That includes supporting a political process that integrates North and East Syria into the future Syrian framework,” she said. “This shift in policy direction, while subtle, indicates that the US is acknowledging that a sustainable resolution to the Kurdish issue is linked to broader geopolitical stability.”
The role of the Kurdish Peace Institute
Finally, Medya News asked how institutions like the Kurdish Peace Institute contribute to shaping US policy. Bodette described the institute’s work as focusing on research and policy recommendations that highlight perspectives from the ground. “We provide an authentic Kurdish lens on the issues, countering biased narratives and advocating for peaceful political solutions,” she explained. “Our expansion into North and East Syria is not just about research—it’s about empowering local researchers, amplifying their voices in policy discussions, and building a culture of analysis that challenges state-driven narratives. This is crucial in an era where misinformation and geopolitical agendas dominate the discourse.”
This conversation provides an essential analysis of the shifting regional landscape, offering valuable insights into US policy, Kurdish political dynamics, and the prospects for peace and stability in Syria.
Watch, listen, and read the full interview on Medya News’ podcast platforms, YouTube channel, and webportal.
INTERVIEW
With the new US administration in place, what shifts do you anticipate in Washington’s approach to its alliance with the Syrian Democratic Forces, SDF, and wider Kurdish policy? Do you expect a continuation or a recalibration of support for the SDF amid broader regional dynamics? Could Trump’s past-transactional approach with Erdoğan re-emerge, or do you foresee a different dynamic this time?
The United States right now, like regional and international powers with interests in Syria, will be recalibrating its policy, not necessarily because of the change in administration, but because of the change in conditions on the ground in Syria following the fall of the Assad regime. The United States is now looking towards its engagement with the new Syrian authorities, led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), but also maintaining its engagement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) towards the ultimate end of a stable Syria that is not a threat to its neighbours or towards the United States, that is not a ground for groups like ISIS to gain power, and that can contribute positively to regional stability. Those are the objectives of US policy right now.
And in service of those objectives, a negotiated settlement between northeast Syria and the new Syrian authorities, wherein the North-East is integrated into the new Syrian system in such a way that it remains stable and that there are not grievances created that might cause renewed conflict, is in the US interests. We’re seeing from the US support for and maintenance of a ceasefire with Turkey along the Euphrates that preventing a Turkish invasion appears to be a US interest as well, further in service of that goal of creating stability and preventing a new rise of ISIS. And ultimately, support for related political processes in the region, whether that’s deepening inter-Kurdish engagement between Iraqi Kurdistan and northeast Syria, or even tacitly, not publicly but certainly behind the scenes, I think support for renewed efforts to resolve the Kurdish question in Turkey.
These all seem to be the direction that US policy is taking at this current point in time for the ultimate end of winding down conflicts in the region, creating longer-term stability, and allowing the US ultimately to pivot from a focus on conflicts in places like Syria towards an orientation more towards great power competition. So I think that we won’t see major changes in US policy based on differences in the administration, though Trump is of course always a wild card. What we’ll see is the US working towards some kind of political settlement in Syria, wherein Syria does not become destabilizing, a destabilizing force vis-a-vis the US or its allies.
And that will involve support for a political process where the North-East is included for inter-Kurdish dialogue, and ultimately for an end to Turkey’s militarized approach to the Kurdish issue.
There have been recurring reports and speculations about a potential US withdrawal from the Middle East, including north and east Syria. Do you think such a move aligns with the broader strategic vision of the new Trump administration? What consequences would a US pullback have for the SDF and the stability of the region?
So a US pullback absent a political settlement would result in a revival of ISIS, in further Turkish aggression in the northeast, leading to not only abuses against civilians, but destabilizing mass displacement of Kurdish, Christians, Yezidis and other populations from the region. And essentially the renewal, the restart of Syria’s civil war, which following the fall of Assad, the international community and certainly Syrian people on the ground have celebrated as ending. So this would obviously be an outcome that people on the ground, regional actors and the international community hope to avoid.
And while certainly Turkey has committed to continue to provoke the SDF and Kurdish communities with ongoing drone strikes and infiltration attempts around the Euphrates, around Tashrin and Karakozak, we’ve seen that Turkey has not crossed that line and that they have not been behaving as aggressively towards northeast Syria as they have at other points in time. We can look back to, for example, to the repeated drone campaigns against the region’s infrastructure. So I think we can assess that right now, the US does not believe that a Turkish intervention against northeast Syria and the resulting destabilizing conflict that it would create in Syria, but also in Turkey and Iraq as well, is in the interests of the US or in the interests of the United States partners in Europe or the Middle East.
And therefore, I don’t expect that we will see a withdrawal without it being tied to some kind of political agreement. Because of course, ultimately what I think everybody wants to see in Syria is a Syria where no foreign forces are present and where there’s some kind of more inclusive, more democratic and more stable political settlement that addresses the root causes of conflict that led to things like Assad’s abuses and the rise of ISIS. So for that reason, while we may see a withdrawal, that is likely to be tied to some kind of political settlement.
Right now, I do think it’s important for viewers to understand when you hear news about US policies, it’s important to recognize how the US political system functions. Reporting, for example, like the NBC report that, you mentioned on the Pentagon drawing up contingency plans for a withdrawal, this is something that national security institutions in States around the world do. Most governments have contingency plans for a wide variety of policies.
This does not necessarily mean that a policy has been reached yet. This is still something that’s in active contestation. And if we look at statements from other US officials, if we look at the position of the Senate and the Congress, we’ll see that there is consensus that the US engagement in the North-East in Syria with regards to the counter-ISIS mission and otherwise is still ongoing.
There is not a belief that Turkey is capable of taking over the counter-ISIS fight. And I think US policymakers know, just as other regional actors and international actors know, that further Turkish intervention would revive ISIS and restart the Syrian civil war and make a Turkish-Kurdish peace regionally impossible for another generation. I think that that’s an outcome that everybody is trying to avoid and, thus a withdrawal or other such US policy move not tied to a political settlement, would be the sort of unnecessarily destabilizing step that I don’t think the new US administration wants to take.
I think when we look at what the Trump administration is trying to accomplish, you know, they’re trying to focus on consolidating American power for great power competition. They are seeing what we’re all seeing, that the international system is moving towards a more multipolar orientation, that the US is no longer the only hegemonic force in global politics. And the Trump administration in its attempts to take steps like shutting down USAID, moving that under the State Department, engaging directly with Russia over Ukraine without the involvement of the Europeans, their look at the changing posture in the Middle East, they’re moving towards this orientation to great power competition.
And to be able to do that effectively, to compete with Russia and China as they want to do, these smaller destabilizing conflicts in places like the Middle East and the presence of groups like ISIS is suboptimal. So for that, I do imagine that any kind of retrenchment from the Middle East will be based on winding down conflicts in that area.
Whether they’ll be able to do that successfully or not, I don’t know. We can see, for example, that they were able to, this new administration got a ceasefire in Palestine, but is now suggesting that the US buy the Gaza Strip. So we see contradictory steps there in terms of whether their peace plans will create stability. But that is the strategic orientation. And I do think that it presents opportunities for a political settlement in Syria and to Kurdish issue regionally.
As discussions on Syria’s reconstruction and political framework continue, what role do you see for the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, AANES? What challenges and opportunities exist for its formal recognition? And how can it secure a place in the broader negotiations on Syria’s future?
The Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria (AANES) right now governs 25% of the country, boasts a larger armed force, the SDF, than any other actor when we look at HTS or the various Turkey-backed militias, and is the only actor in Syria that has even attempted to put forward a vision of governance that is based on pluralism, religious freedom, gender equality, and other values that not only lead to better conditions for people on the ground, but are proven to help create stability and resolve conflict in the long term.
Because of this, their inclusion in any kind of political settlement is essential, not only for the protection of the communities that live in the Northeast, including Kurdish, Christian, and Yazidi communities, but also for the inclusion of these principles in any broader settlement. When we look at the vision that the HTS-led government has been putting forward, it’s clear that they, despite the rhetoric that they’re putting forward to the international community, they are not interested in a State that is inclusive of the diverse ethnic and religious groups of Syria, or of the diverse political perspectives across different Syrian communities. They’re interested in concentrated centralized power.
Conversely, they’re not capable of holding that power. You know, what I’ve been hearing from friends who’ve been able to go to Damascus, and from all of the reporting that is publicly available, we can conclude that HTS does not effectively control all of the territory that is coloured in green in Syria map, I believe it is, on the map, and that this does not even include the parts of Syria, like the Northeast, that they have not expanded control into so far. So while they have these rather dangerous intentions, they’re simply not capable of enforcing that vision on all of Syria just yet.
In order to have any chance at uniting the country and governing areas like the Northeast, they’re going to have to make compromises. And the kinds of compromises that the Autonomous Administration can ask for, on matters like local self-government, religious freedom, the rights of women, the protection of the linguistic and cultural rights of Kurds and other communities, these are compromises that won’t just benefit people in the Northeast, but will benefit all of Syria. There’s also the factor of international engagement at play here.
The current HTS-led government is going on an international public relation blitz right now. They’re trying to bring in not just legitimacy from the international community, but in particular, foreign investment to begin to rebuild Syria after devastating conflict and the regime’s neglect of its people. Now, for them to be able to do that, they need to gain the trust of the international community, particularly important when you look at the past.
This is a group that evolved out of the Syrian branch of Al-Qaeda. That trust deficit is something that is not a superficial matter for them. And when you look at the Northeast, you have actors that have been the partner of choice for the international community in the fight against ISIS.
You have a place where international organizations can work safely, where foreign diplomats visit. That bond and that track record, that presence of an actor in Syria that the international community knows it can trust on issues of key global national security like countering ISIS, that’s something that the Northeast brings to the table in negotiations. That’s a strength that they have.
And for the new government, if it wants to legitimize itself to the international community, reaching an accommodation with the SDF and the Autonomous Administration and integrating them into a future state will go a long way for helping them show that they have changed, that they have been able to moderate, and that the international community can invest in them and support them. So the SDF have some strengths there. The Autonomous Administration have some strengths there in negotiations.
And that really presents an opportunity. They can give this new government something it lacks and something that it needs. So while the threats from the political vision of HTS and certainly the threat of Turkish invasion and, as I spoke about before, the resumption of the conflict are very real, the vision that Northeast Syria is putting forward in terms of pluralism, religious freedom, and gender equality, and the longstanding partnership that they have with the international community are real assets that they will be able to bring to the table towards hopefully a political solution that will work for all people in Syria.
The SDF, AANES, and the Syrian Democratic Council, SDC, have consistently pushed for inclusion in political negotiations on Syria’s future. To what extent do you see Turkey as a barrier to this process? Given Turkey’s NATO membership and strategic importance, how do you think the US will navigate Ankara’s opposition while maintaining its relationship with Kurdish-led structures?
Right now, I think it’s becoming clear that the Kurdish issue in Syria cannot be resolved without the resolution of the transnational Kurdish issue caused by Turkey’s pursuit of a military solution to its own Kurdish question.
And the best opportunity for a successful negotiated settlement between northeast Syria and the new authorities in Damascus lies in the successful resumption of the Turkish-Kurdish peace process, which as viewers of Medya News will be well aware, has been underway since October and possibly before. So if the Kurdish issue can be resolved in Turkey, and the conflict can be ended, and Turkey can drop its opposition to Kurdish civil and political rights and local self-government, then not only will Turkey end its threats to northeast Syria and take pressure off the Damascus government to obstruct a deal, but we could even see a scenario where a Turkish government that has resolved this issue can even play a constructive role in supporting the resolution of the Kurdish issue in Syria as well.
So the future of the Syrian political settlement is very much tied to the future of the political settlement that is currently being negotiated and discussed between Turkey and the PKK and the wider Kurdish movement.
If that peace process succeeds, then there are incredible possibilities for a political resolution and peace and stability in Syria. If the Turkish government walks away from the process again, as they did in 2015, it’s likely that the resumption of conflict will, as I’ve said before, revive ISIS and restart the Syrian civil war at a time when Syrians, the region, and the world simply cannot afford for that to happen.
Now, this dynamic is something that US policymakers, regional actors, and international actors are aware of, and I think we can look at indicators like the fact that a ceasefire was forced before Turkey attacked core Kurdish areas like Kobani, that there’s been significant international mediation, both between the SDF and Turkey, between the SDF and HTS, between the Iraqi Kurdish leadership and the Syrian Kurdish leadership.
All of this diplomatic traffic suggests that the international community is aware that this deal needs to happen and that conditions need to be in place to make this deal possible, which means right now, at least, no major escalation of conflict in northern Syria. We can look at the past half-decade or so, of US policy to sort of understand that there’s been a change in how the US has viewed this issue following Operation Peace Spring in 2019, where President Trump green-lighted Erdogan’s attack on an occupation of Res-ul Ayn (Serêkanî) and Tal Abyad (Girêspî).
US policymakers and the international community realized immediately that Turkey’s militarized solution to the Kurdish issue is a national security catastrophe for everyone except Erdoğan and his own government’s ambitions, that this would lead to mass displacement, that this would give ISIS a new lease on life, and that this would prolong conflict in Syria and make the Syrian issue more difficult to resolve.
After 2019, going into 2020 and 2021, the US began to engage differently. You know, in my conversations both in the United States and in Kurdistan, I’ve heard that the efforts to encourage a political or non-military solution to the wider Kurdish conflict began at that time. In 2023, we at the Kurdish Peace Institute reported for the first time that the US had been asking the SDF to ask the PKK to declare a ceasefire prior to the partial ceasefire that they declared in the run-up to the Turkish elections that year.
So, and then in the summer of 2022 as well, we had a Biden administration Pentagon official say for the first time that there wasn’t a military solution to Turkey’s Kurdish issue and that they ought to reconsider the actual impact on the ground of their repeated incursions into Iraq and Syria. So, I think we started to see that sign of a shift following the disaster that was Operation Peace Spring, and now we’re seeing that shift come into fruition with the way that the US is engaging towards the inclusion of Northeast Syria in a political settlement.
They understand that you (US) have to solve the whole problem, and their partnership with the SDF and alliance with Turkey, as an actor that has contacts on both sides, this allows them to, if they choose to, play a quite constructive role in making that happen.
I think right now the reason that the US and other coalition countries aren’t engaging publicly is because this process is very sensitive. On both the Turkish side and the Kurdish side, you know, there’s a real fear that too much international noise about what’s going on, too quickly, might encourage spoilers or harm the public perceptions and narratives that could support the process.
But I would assess that behind the scenes, the US wants to see the end of conflicts in the region. The US knows that without a political solution to the Kurdish issue, that’s not possible.
And so they’re taking advantage of their relationships with the SDF, the KRG, and Turkey to promote negotiations. I would imagine that that policy will continue in the future.
With the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, IMEC, emerging as a significant geopolitical project that sidelines Turkey, what implications do you see for the broader Kurdish struggle? How might this initiative affect North and East Syria’s positioning in the regional economic and political landscape?
I think that, as I said before, we’re transitioning from, or you could argue we have transitioned from, a unipolar international system with the US as the one hegemonic power, which it was following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, towards a more multipolar system where the US is but one of many major powers in the system. We have the US, Russia, China. And then at the regional level, the inter-regional competitions for power are also continuing in the Middle East, looking at Turkey, Iran, the Gulf states.
So this kind of international orientation creates both opportunities and challenges for groups like North East Syria, the Autonomous Administration, and stateless peoples, divided peoples and movements like the Kurdish people, who are occupied by not one power but divided between four occupying nation states.
The shift towards a more multipolar system, on the one hand, increases the ability of Turkey to play different blocks off of each other, but it also increases the Kurdish movement’s capacity to do the same thing. There’s a wider variety of partnerships that are available in such a system versus in a system where there is only one block.
For example, growing tensions between the US and Turkey are not something that would have been possible in the previous bipolar system of the Cold War, where Turkey was firmly in the US block, or arguably in a unipolar system where Turkey didn’t have other powers to go to and ask for support, given that it could rely on a power like the US. So there are opportunities here in that Turkey will create tensions and balances between itself and major powers that a weaker, smaller actor in the system, such as North East Syria or the Kurdish movement, can use to its benefit as it creates alliances. And what we’ve seen from Turkey’s leaders over these past few years is that they, at times, successfully balance this multipolar system, but at times they overstep. And when they overstep and they cause problems for a larger state like Russia or like the US or Europe, this can backfire on them.
This can create opportunities for Kurdish engagement. And as you mentioned also, this sort of shift towards multipolarity means that the old players, states like the US and Russia, aren’t the only states that it’s relevant or beneficial to engage with. And Kurdish political actors can engage with other regional and international powers. They can look at other Middle Eastern states, they can look at Europe. Looking at this economic corridor, you see an interesting collection of everything from South Asian states to European states that are engaged, that are sidelining Turkey. So there are opportunities for creative and flexible diplomacy that I think can certainly benefit North East Syria, the Kurdish movement.
Also, there are opportunities for Turkey as well. With US, we can say sort of retrenchment on the Ukraine issue, we’re seeing Turkey becoming a bit more important to Europe. But at the same time, some of Turkey’s policies in Syria, support for these extremist groups, continue to threaten Europe as well.
So there are tensions there. It is a time of change, both regionally and internationally, where the Kurdish movement and actors like North East Syria, if they approach it carefully and make creative alliances, can take advantage.
How can institutions like the Turkish Peace Institute contribute to shaping US policy in this regard?
What we have always worked to do and what we are doing now is first to inform policymakers and the public about what is going on in Kurdistan and the region from perspectives that are on the ground and that know the developments firsthand, and that don’t approach these issues through the, we can say nation status perspectives of a Turkish or Syrian or Iraqi lens.
But from an authentic Kurdish lens in these countries. We have been from the beginning, working on doing research and analysis for the objective of peaceful political solutions that respect and represent the rights of all people in the region. And while that was unpopular at first, as I’ve said before, I think that the international community has now come around to the fact that if you don’t end this conflict now, it will only create the next major international issue, the next conflict, the next rise of a group like ISIS, the next civil war like Syria’s five years or 10 years or 15 years down the line.
And so I think that the conclusions that we’ve been drawing and the pro-peace, pro-political solution perspective that we’ve been putting out has been proven correct by events. And we’re just continuing to put that perspective out there and transitioning into making more recommendations about now that the argument that a political solution is the answer has been won, how can that be operationalized? What can governments, international organizations, and other interested parties do to support this kind of solution? We also, with our branching out into opening a local office in northeast Syria, we are trying to develop the culture of research and analysis in the region as well. This kind of foreign policy, international relations, strategy, political analysis, these are opportunities that have been denied to Kurdish communities in particular, and really all communities under authoritarian regimes in these regions.
And so by reaching out and expanding our work there, we try to work with the local community and local researchers to build up that culture there and help them develop the capacity to represent themselves internationally in the fields of analysis, foreign policy, and international relations, and to be able to push back against a lot of the more, we can say, biased or one-sided or pro-war narratives that come from governments like Turkey and the sort of media and research ecosystems that are affiliated with them. So we hope that we have played a small part in promoting more peace and more political solutions, and we hope to continue to do so. And I certainly believe that right now the most important thing that researchers and analysts internationally can do is go to the region, see it for yourself, speak to people, develop an understanding of what is actually going on, and then in terms of producing recommendations and solutions, don’t have a short-sighted perspective towards simply what the current alliances are or what the stated priorities of governments are.
Look at long-term solutions and realize that in this region in particular, there will be no long-term solutions without peace, stability, and the inclusion of all communities that have been left out of this prevailing regional order. We saw how that model worked in Syria, we saw it fail, we saw this conflict end the way that it has ended, and hopefully researchers can contribute to promoting a more peaceful and pluralist future for Kurdish communities and all communities in Syria, in Turkey, and across the region.
Megan, thank you for your valuable contributions today. We really appreciate you coming to Medya News.
Thank you so much.
Thank you for having me.
Have a great rest of your day.
