Abdullah Öcalan’s recent call for a ‘new social contract’ has reignited the long-standing debate over constitutional reform in Turkey. Following his historic ‘Call for Peace and Democratic Society’, issued in February 2025, recent developments have refocused attention on the resolution of the Kurdish issue and the democratisation of the country.
Related Article:
Rethinking coexistence in Turkey: Öcalan’s call for a new Social Contract
During a meeting with the İmralı Delegation of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party on 18 May, Öcalan stressed the need for a legal framework to guide Kurdish–Turkish relations and reaffirmed the necessity of a new constitutional arrangement. His remarks prompted responses from senior government figures. AKP Deputy Chairman Efkan Ala described the current constitution as a remnant of the politics of the coup era, and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan subsequently announced that efforts were underway to replace what he termed the ‘shame of the coup constitution’.
Related Articles:
Abdullah Öcalan calls for ‘new social contract’ following İmralı meeting
Erdoğan announces commission of ten lawyers to draft new constitution
The idea of constitutional reform has long featured in Öcalan’s political thinking. Throughout the 2013 to 2015 peace process, he repeatedly called for a new legal framework. Central to his proposal was a return to the 1921 Constitution, alongside the “Kurdish Reform Proposal”, both of which, he argued, could serve as building blocks for a more democratic and pluralistic political order.
Revisiting Öcalan’s constitutional proposal
Öcalan’s vision has been revisited in a recent article by journalist Özgür Paksoy, published by Mezopotamya Ajansı, in which he explores the relevance of the 1921 Constitution to current constitutional debates. In his review of Öcalan’s past proposals, Paksoy outlines how the imprisoned Kurdish leader consistently highlighted the 1921 Constitution as a model for inclusive governance. According to Paksoy, Öcalan regarded this 1921 founding document as the only legal text in Turkish history that recognised cultural and ethnic plurality, offering space for regional autonomy and multi-ethnic governance.
Paksoy emphasises that Öcalan viewed the 1921 Constitution not merely as a legal artifact but as a political tool capable of addressing structural problems in Turkish society, especially the Kurdish issue. During the 2013 to 2015 peace negotiations, Öcalan suggested that this foundational document could inspire a constitutional framework rooted in decentralisation and cultural inclusion.
Importantly, Paksoy reports that Öcalan drew comparisons to multinational constitutional arrangements elsewhere, particularly citing the Spanish Constitution, which provides for autonomous regional governments. He called for similar constitutional guarantees in Turkey that would ensure legal protections for cultural organisation, education and political participation based on distinct community identities.
A forgotten framework: The Kurdish reform proposal
In addition to the 1921 model, Paksoy notes Öcalan’s insistence on what he called the ‘Kurdish Reform Proposal’, a 20-article document drafted in earlier years that promotes cultural and political rights for all of Turkey’s communities. Öcalan argued that national unity should not require cultural uniformity, and instead proposed a citizenship model that affirms the legitimacy of diverse historical and ethnic identities.
The relevance of the Kurdish Reform Proposal is further illuminated by commentary from authors including Ümit Kardaş and Murat İnceoğlu. As Kardaş explains, the proposal was brought before the Turkish Grand National Assembly in 1922 and included measures for local Kurdish governance, bilingual education and cultural rights. Though it was approved, it was later erased from official records, reflecting the central state’s discomfort with decentralisation. İnceoğlu notes that this episode remains a critical yet suppressed moment in the constitutional history of the republic.
The 1921 law as a blueprint for pluralism
A clearer understanding of the historical context and political intent behind the 1921 legal text helps explain its relevance today, particularly in a moment when a half-century of armed conflict has given way to calls for peace and a democratic, inclusive state. Although commonly referred to as a constitution, the document was originally titled the Law on Fundamental Organisation (Teşkilat-ı Esasiye) and adopted in January 1921 by the first Grand National Assembly in Ankara during the War of Independence*. At the time, Ottoman state officials loyal to the Sultan in Istanbul sought to dismantle the emerging Ankara-based movement. The 1921 law signalled a break from imperial rule and aimed to legitimise power through popular will.
Unlike the period following the republic’s declaration in 1923, which entrenched Turkish nation-state identity, Ankara’s earlier leadership sought to represent a broader concept of popular will. Figures like Mustafa Kemal actively sought public legitimacy, engaging with both Sunni religious leaders, Alevi-Bektashi communities, as well as Kurds. In this context, the name of the 1921 law was itself a political gesture. Naming it the Law on Fundamental Organisation underlined the intention to create a legal framework not merely for state institutions, but for a new political order based on the collective will of various communities. It aimed to provide a legal foundation for a pluralistic order made up of various political and religious communities. In practice, the 1921 law served as the de facto constitution of the resistance, operating within the Ottoman legal tradition of 1876 (amended in 1909) and enabling Ankara to exercise pluralist republican authority before the formal establishment of the republic.
As constitutional debates resurface in Turkey, revisiting the pluralist foundations of the 1921 law and Öcalan’s proposals offers more than historical reflection. It brings renewed attention to a legal vision rooted in the very first clause of the 1921 Law: “Sovereignty rests unconditionally with the people.” (Egemenlik kayıtsız şartsız milletindir) This foundational principle, once used to legitimise a resistance against imperial rule, now resonates in efforts to establish an inclusive and participatory constitutional order.
Whether this moment will lead to meaningful reform depends not only on political negotiations, but on the willingness to engage with the democratic impulses embedded in Turkey’s own legal and historical legacy.
* Erik Jan Zürcher, Turkey: A modern History, I.B. Tauris, 2004.
