Amed Dicle
The crisis period the modern Middle East is currently going through cannot be interpreted solely through changes in borders or military equations. Multilayered processes such as the internal decay of sovereignty regimes, the assertion of political agency by peoples, and the redistribution of global powers are forcing every actor in the region to reckon with history, society, and their own foundations of existence. One of the most critical junctures in this reckoning is undoubtedly shaped around the Kurdish question. However, this issue is no longer merely an “ethnic problem”; it now signifies the redefinition of the state, the limitation of violence, and the reestablishment of the social contract. In this context, the Call for Peace and Democratic Society, known as the “Call of the Century” rising from İmralı, is not merely a text or a diplomatic initiative; it is a paradigmatic intervention.
Mr Abdullah Öcalan’s call on 27 February 2025 is not only a proposal for the resolution of the Kurdish question but also a radical reconstruction proposal for Turkey’s structural transformation and the democratic future of the Middle East. The fact that a political actor who has been held under aggravated isolation for many years has once again taken on such a decisive role at a strategic moment makes it necessary to understand not just the content of the call but also the historical ground and political ruptures that made it possible. For this call is not a product of a moment of crisis, but the result of a long-standing ideological accumulation and political resistance.
Today, the emergence of this call demands a simultaneous reading of the multifaceted memory of resistance within Kurdish society, the deepening state crises in the Middle East, and the governance deadlock the Republic of Turkey has found itself in. Because the issue is no longer just about restarting a resolution process; it is about whether a regime structure can be rebuilt. At this point, evaluating the content of the call, its interlocutors, its feasibility, and its historical continuity is not only a political analysis but also an act of envisioning the future.
Factors that prepared the political ground for the call
Mr Öcalan’s 27 February call is not the extension of any political initiative; it is a historical intervention that matured through a long-standing resistance and a multidimensional crisis. The essential conditions that enabled the emergence of this call can be assessed on three levels: the deadlock in the founding paradigm of the state, the historical accumulation created by the Kurdish social struggle, and the transformation of regional geopolitics.
Firstly, the denial and suppression policies pursued by the Republic of Turkey toward the Kurdish question for over a century can no longer sustain even their own internal coherence. The Kurdish people have reached a point where they are not only demanding rights but are building them and institutionalising political subjectivity. At this point, Mr Öcalan’s paradigmatic intervention elevates the issue from a solvable ethnic tension to a political matter requiring the restructuring of the system. This is the core reason why the call emphasises not only “peace” but also “reconstruction”.
Secondly, the military, political, and psychological siege implemented through the “Collapse Action Plan” since 2015 has neither been able to eliminate the Kurdish Freedom Movement nor break the social resistance. On the contrary, this siege strategy has led Kurdish society and its leading structures toward deeper strategic questioning. As a result, Mr Öcalan’s emphasis on “transferring the ground of conflict and violence to legal and political ground” is not a retreat but, on the contrary, the beginning of a more comprehensive political projection. The internal critical approach toward the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s (PKK) methods of struggle and organisational forms also shows that the call is directed not only at the state but also at the movement itself.
Thirdly, in the regional context, the Middle East has become the epicentre of a new struggle for hegemony, especially after the Israel-Gaza war following 7 October 2023. The direct consequences of this war have deeply shaken not only the Palestinian people but also the regimes of countries such as Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Lebanon. The heavy losses of Hezbollah backed by Iran, the unravelling of the Assad regime in Syria, and the reshaping of the dynamics in Rojava are developments that directly threaten Turkey’s existence. These are not only signs of a regional crisis but also of the collapse of the current nation-state structures and their security-based political styles. In this sense, Mr Öcalan’s call is not just an internal reform but a theoretical framework for a reconstruction project in favour of the peoples of the Middle East.
Under these conditions, the 27 February call is not merely a call for a ceasefire or a negotiation proposal. The call states that the PKK has fulfilled its historical role and that a transformation process should begin on the basis of democratic politics and legal frameworks, through a new form of struggle. However, this is not only an organisational change but also a radical proposal for the transformation of the state mindset — in clearer terms, it is not a “negotiation paradigm”, but a proposal for a “foundational paradigm”.
The call as a desire for social and political transformation
Mr Öcalan’s call for “Peace and Democratic Society” is not only a political solution proposal but also a historical invitation to mend over a century of social rupture, repression, and fragmentation. This call sets forth the need to rebuild Turkish-Kurdish relations on the basis of equal citizenship, democratic partnership, and historical reckoning, instead of a military and security-cantered language. In this respect, the content of the call offers a much deeper social contract than a classical “political solution”.
The conceptual framework Mr Öcalan uses in the text is a direct opposition to the unitary, centralist, and denialist structure of the nation-state. The emphasis on a “democratic society” implies not only a form of governance but also a new vision of society, a new historical consciousness, and political ethics. In this sense, the call is addressed not only to the Kurdish people but to all segments of Turkish society. It is neither merely a peace text nor only a critique of the opposition; it is also a rethinking of Turkey.
In terms of its content, the call approaches the demands of the Kurdish people not only at the level of cultural rights and recognition but on the basis of political subjectivity. This involves not just constitutional recognition but the understanding that Kurds must play a founding role in a new constitutional order. Within this framework, a new model is proposed that is not only inclusive of Kurds but that prioritises democratic nationhood, pluralism, and local representation — in contrast to a system that is increasingly incapable of governing even its own majority.
Especially the central role given to women, youth, and different ethnic and religious communities in the call demonstrates that this is not only a negotiation proposal but also a “democratic modernity” program. The vision of a society that is based on women’s liberation, ecology, and pluralism elevates the call into a programmatic integrity that can resonate beyond the Kurdish question and on a regional scale.
At this point, reducing the content of the call to a dialogue between political elites would be a narrowing of its scope. Mr Öcalan also appeals in his call to “society’s will to rebuild itself”. For the aim of the call is not only to stop the conflict but to enable a collective transformation that can also repair the political and cultural deformations caused by the conflict.
This desire for transformation emerges not only as a product of the Kurdish movement but also as an alternative to the representation crisis, democratic contraction, and injustices experienced by broad segments of Turkish society. In this context, the call is not just an appeal for a solution but the foundation of a new “foundational politics” approach. This foundational understanding is envisioned not as the project of a single party or movement, but as a platform that the entire society can construct together.
The practical response to the call: The state, the movement, and the international context
Mr Öcalan’s “Peace and Democratic Society” call dated 27 February is not just an ideological framework but also a political program that must be tested in real political terms. Therefore, the significance of the call lies not only in its articulation but in how and by whom it is received. In this context, three primary actors are decisive: the Turkish Republic and the current ruling bloc, the Kurdish Freedom Movement itself, and finally, the international context that directly or indirectly affects the call.
First, the primary addressee of the call, the Turkish state, has not yet fully emerged from the influence of the security-based paradigm. Despite some messages of “normalisation” or “social unity” voiced rhetorically by the government, no practical steps corresponding to the essence of the call have been taken. No debate has been initiated at the parliamentary level, and the harsh conditions of isolation on İmralı Island continue. Yet for the call to become a real negotiation process, it is a primary requirement that Mr Öcalan be provided conditions where he can at least freely express his thoughts. Without this, any discussion will remain ungrounded.
The Kurdish Freedom Movement, on the other hand, has received the call positively both theoretically and practically; as of 1 March, it declared a unilateral ceasefire, demonstrating its will to open a path for the process. However, placing all the responsibilities stemming from the call on the movement alone would mean pushing it beyond its historical mission. The essence of the call is not the transformation of the PKK but the transformation of the structural mindset of the Turkish Republic. Therefore, placing discussions such as “disarmament” or “dissolution of the organisation” ahead of the call is both a historical distortion and an attempt to sabotage its purpose.
At the international level, the timing of the call is noteworthy. The geopolitical fault lines in the Middle East are being reshaped. The fracture that began with the Gaza war, the weakening of Iran’s regional influence, Israel’s increasingly aggressive security strategy, and the US efforts to redefine its regional position — all of these developments are pushing Turkey toward a more stable internal structure. In this context, Mr Öcalan’s call is not only an issue of domestic politics; it also has the potential to be a key element in the regional realignment.
Moreover, we are going through a period in which even the Western powers can no longer tolerate controlled and sustainable crises in the Middle East. Unresolved chronic issues in key countries like Turkey threaten the stability goals of all global blocs. For this reason, Mr Öcalan’s call invites not only Turkey but also the region and global actors to a new way of thinking.
Conclusion: More than a call
The 27 February call is not merely a solution proposal. It is a comprehensive historical intervention against century-old nation-state reflexes, monist identity politics, and exclusionary definitions of citizenship. This intervention addresses not only the Kurdish question but also Turkey’s democratisation problem, the reconstruction of the Middle East, and the lack of foundations for social peace.
Whether the call will be implemented or not is no longer solely dependent on Mr Öcalan’s stance or the PKK’s approach. It is a collective test for all political actors in Turkey, societal dynamics, and regional balances. And once again, this test poses the same question: Will this country confront denial, or will it reproduce denial with persistence?
Now the issue is not just hearing the call, but responding to it. And that response will either mark the beginning of a new social contract or be recorded as yet another missed historical opportunity.
Amed Dicle was born and raised in Diyarbakır, Turkey. He has worked for Kurdish-language media outlets in Europe, including Roj TV, Sterk TV and ANF. His work has taken him to Rojava, Syria, Iraq and many countries across Europe. Follow him on X.
