Sarah Glynn
On Monday, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced the decision taken at their twelfth congress, which was held from 5-7 May simultaneously in two separate locations to reduce the dangers from continuing Turkish attacks. The congress agreed “to dissolve the PKK’s organisational structure and end the armed struggle, with the implementation process to be managed and led by Leader Apo [Abdullah Öcalan].” Their public statement described this as “the beginning of a new era for our Freedom Movement,” in which they will seek “a common homeland and equal citizenship” through democratic struggle. They describe this as “a new phase in the peace and democratic society process and the struggle for socialism”.
The announcement, which reflected Öcalan’s call of 27 February, had been widely expected, and was almost universally welcomed, in Turkey and across the world. The only noticeable dissenters were some armchair warriors for Kurdish Nationalism, and ultra-nationalist Turks – such as the former admiral who complained on live television that now they would lose their justification for fighting the Kurds in Syria.
The PKK have given an unequivocal statement of intent, but the answers to key questions remain hidden and uncertain. Öcalan’s call followed months of secret discussions with the Turkish authorities. The Turkish government insists that they have engaged in no bargaining and made no concessions; but Öcalan called for peace AND democracy, and there is a clear expectation that the PKK dissolution will bring changes. The PKK announcement states, “Implementing these decisions requires that Leader Apo lead and guide the process, that his right to democratic politics be recognised, and that solid, comprehensive legal guarantees be established. At this stage, it is essential that the Grand National Assembly of Turkey play its role with historical responsibility.”
What Turkey should do next
It is now even more true that the onus rests with the Turkish Government to enable the process to move forward. They must make the legal and political changes needed, including providing security guarantees to make disarmament and dissolution possible, and ensuring that Öcalan is free and able to play his vital part. They need to provide democratic freedoms to allow political differences to be addressed through democratic means; and, if they want to achieve peace, they need to work with other parties in the parliament, and not reduce the process to political one-upmanship and a vehicle for President Erdoğan to remain in power.
The end of the armed struggle ought to mean that Turkey stops their attacks and military occupation in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, where the PKK has their bases, and that they can no longer attempt to claim a pretext for treating everyone struggling for Kurdish rights as “terrorists”. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and their Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have never posed any threat to Turkey, but now, even the pretence that they might do so has gone. It should be even more difficult to justify using terrorist legislation to arrest politicians who demand Kurdish rights; and the thousands of political prisoners – from party leaders, MPs and mayors, to local activists – ought to be released. This should be an occasion for a return to democracy, so that differences can be addressed through political means, without returning to violence.
What Turkey has done
The first responses of the Turkish Government have not provided much ground for optimism. They are continuing to bomb the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and the Community Peacemaker Teams NGO records that bombardments and attacks are back at the level they were before the PKK announced a ceasefire in response to Öcalan’s call. President Erdoğan claims that the Syrian Democratic Forces, which Turkey refuses to differentiate from the PKK, must disband too. He also has his eye on Kurdish organisations across the rest of the world. And although Erdoğan has said that the replacement of elected mayors by trustees “will once again become an exception,” he is planning constitutional changes that will reduce the power of local authorities and consolidate the hold of the centre.
The pro-government Daily Sabah observes that the conditions of Öcalan’s imprisonment “may be eased” and that some terrorism related laws may be changed, but they also report that the Justice Minister has claimed that Öcalan’s “Right to Hope” has not been discussed. This refers to the right to be considered for parole, and Turkey’s failure to allow this has been condemned by the European Court of Human Rights.
Concerns over process
While the PKK’s decision has been welcomed, there remain major concerns about the implication of agreeing to put down arms as a first move rather than at the end of a long peace process. There are also concerns about the absence of any external international involvement that could provide neutral support and ensure that the process moves forward, and about the lack of involvement from anyone outwith the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and their Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) allies.
Lessons from Ireland
Those of us from the UK naturally look to Ireland for comparison, and, indeed, the Irish struggle has provided inspiration for the Kurds, while Irish republicans have supported Kurdish actions. The Northern Irish peace agreement brought a decline in violence and an end to the overwhelming British military presence and to uniquely oppressive legislation. At the same time, the move away from armed struggle brought a legitimisation and subsequent growth of republican politics. However, success has been strictly limited. The powers of the Northern Ireland Assembly are small, and the power sharing system has been frequently paralysed by disagreements. Sectarianism persists, and the loyalist (pro-British) paramilitaries never disarmed. Some republicans refused to accept the need to stop fighting and reformed as the “Real IRA”. (The huge respect for Öcalan’s leadership makes any Kurdish equivalent of this group extremely unlikely.)
The main Irish Republican movement allowed itself to be tamed and incorporated into the neoliberal political system and, much to the frustration of its more left-wing members, failed to focus on the class issues that determine lives across the community divide. The peace dividend has helped the better off, but Northern Ireland remains an area of exceptional social deprivation. Addressing class exploitation is vital, not just in itself, but also for the future of intercommunity relations: where there is class exploitation, the ruling class diverts discontent through the old tactics of “divide and rule”, encouraging violent antagonisms.
For the Irish Republican Army (IRA), as for the Kurds, disarmament was a leap of faith, but it was a leap that came 3½ years after the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, and after a process of talks with different British governments. According to the IRA statement at the time, the decision to disarm was made “to save the peace process and to persuade others of our genuine intentions.” Irish emigration had ensured strong American interest in Ireland, and the United States played a major role in brokering the Good Friday Agreement. An Independent International Commission on Decommissioning agreed and monitored the decommissioning process. The only supervisory organisation mentioned by the Turkish Government with respect to Kurdish disarmament is the Turkish intelligence service.
While the main forces of Irish republicanism have been accused of abandoning more radical social change, in the Kurdish case, the commitment to Öcalan’s philosophy and his interpretation of socialist ideas remains central to the new vision. At the end of their congress, members recited an oath to maintain the PKK’s values, beginning “I will live in a democratic society as a socialist based on the Apo line.”
This principled commitment will not win them supporters among the autocrats and oligarchs now dominating world politics, or even the “liberal democracies” being dragged along in their wake. However, it allows the Kurdish Freedom Movement to continue to provide inspiration across the globe to those looking for an escape from today’s politics and its casual disregard for ordinary lives and for our planet.
The art of the arms deal
The dynamics of today’s world politics of personal power have been on full display this week in President Trump’s visit to the Middle East. Trump is generally not interested in making war, but he likes the power of a strong military, and the economy of the military industrial complex – he has just agreed a $300 million missile sale to Turkey, as well as a massive $142 billion arms deal with Saudi Arabia and further arms deals with Qatar and the UAE. He has no time for human rights or human well-being. The future of millions of people is being decided by a handful of men who regard politics as a business opportunity and draw only a hazy line between the state and their own business deals.
Ahmed al-Sharaa
War-torn Syria is seen by these people as ripe for economic exploitation and for the building of personal and international control and power – and Syria’s “Interim” president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, is ready to oblige. He is ready to prove his worth to the West by adopting their neoliberal politics and by throwing his country open to foreign businesses, and he has shown himself ready to make the concessions necessary for the United States to lift their debilitating sanctions – he is even exploring normalising relations with Israel.
These sanctions have severely damaged Syria’s economy, with disastrous results for the mass of the population, and Trump’s announcement on Tuesday that sanctions would be lifted was greeted with enthusiasm across the country. Trump claimed he was responding to urging by both Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and President Erdoğan. What has been missing from the reporting is the fact that the most severe sanctions – those stipulated by the Caesar Act – were brought in under Trump’s own last presidential term. Destruction of the economy was seen as a legitimate tool for forcing regime change, despite causing mass immiseration, and it is argued that this contributed to the final rapid collapse of President Assad’s regime.
On Wednesday, Trump met al-Sharaa in Riyad, with Erdoğan joining virtually by phone. Afterwards, he gave another example of the fulsome praise he reserves for strong autocratic men.
America’s jihadists
In his search for power, al-Sharaa has demonstrated his pragmatism. The American embrace of the man who, only recently, had a 10-million-dollar bounty on his head is not as surprising as it sounds. The United States had no problem working with friendly dictators in Latin America, and they are prepared to work with those they regard as friendly jihadists too. Their earlier attempts at regime change in Syria involved them giving billions of dollars of arms and training to Islamist opposition groups between 2012 and 2017 through operation “Timber Sycamore”.
In 2021, Frontline made a documentary on al-Sharra, then known as al-Jolani, and his organisation, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). James Jeffrey, a senior US diplomat, who from 2018-20 was United States Special Representative for Syria Engagement, told them, “when there is not the normal setup of nation-states and of international norms and rules and behaviour and international law, you wind up with groups like this, that do things you don’t like, that have a genealogy that is very troubling. But in the here-and-now are the folks you have to deal with to avoid even worse things… They are the least bad option of the various options on Idlib, and Idlib is one of the most important places in Syria, which is one of the most important places right now in the Middle East.”
Jeffrey stated that the US had opened indirect channels with HTS, who insisted that their only goal was to get rid of Assad. “I just did everything I could to be able to monitor what they were doing and ensuring that those people who spoke to them knew what our policy was, which was to leave HTS alone… and I assumed would communicate that to them.”
And what about the Autonomous Administration?
How the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria steers its way through Trump’s politics of the deal remains very uncertain. The United States still needs the Administration’s Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) for the fight against ISIS, especially as ISIS will be hoping to recruit fighters unhappy with al-Sharaa’s conciliatory approach towards Western interests. The Americans are now trying to bring the Syrian Government into the anti-ISIS alliance, and they want them to take over responsibility for the ISIS detention centres in northeast Syria, which raises many concerns over both security and justice.
Although less prominent than the headlined US demands, America has also stipulated the need for Syria to protect and include minority communities. US Deputy Special Envoy for the Middle East, Morgan Ortagus, announced that they gave al-Sharaa “a list of things that we need him to do, especially the protection of minorities in the Middle East, the Christians, the Kurds, the Druze and the Alevis – of everybody. We not only wanted them protected, we want them involved in government.”
This is essential if Syria is to see peace and stability, but more will be needed to tackle the constitutional questions that threaten to reignite ethnic tensions, as well as to stay Turkey’s destructive meddling. More will be needed to counter al-Sharaa’s autocratic path, to promote a measure of local autonomy, and to support the aims and hopes of the people of North and East Syria – and especially the women – who have sacrificed so many thousands of lives in the fight against ISIS.
Sarah Glynn is a writer and activist – check her website and follow her on Twitter or bluesky
