The efforts of Turkey and Iran, which seek to re-establish the Ottoman and Safavid empires through economic and military initiatives, aim to consolidate and expand their regional power. These plans may result in the occupation of Iraqi Kurdistan and the reduction of influence of non-state actors.
Ahmet Davutoğlu’s 2001 book, “Strategic Depth”, is significant for understanding Turkey’s geopolitical ambitions in the Middle East, Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. The ideological and cultural foundations of the book lie in the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, a concept introduced in the 1970s by Ebrahim Kefasoglu and the Turkish Enlightenment Association. Fifty years after its inception and its elaboration in Davutoğlu’s book, the “Development Road” project, as part of Turkey’s broader ambitions, may explain Turkey’s extensive military operations in northern Iraq and Syria (Basur and Rojava), ostensibly conducted under the pretext of combating Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) guerrillas.
In his first visit to Iraq in 13 years, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan oversaw the signing of 26 memorandums of understanding, including one for the “Development Road” infrastructure project, poised to reshape global trade routes. The Development Road trade corridor, spanning from Basra, Iraq, to Avakoy, Turkey, and extending into the European Union customs area, aims to bolster trade and reinforce Turkish influence. This project will link the major port of Al-Faw in the Persian Gulf to Turkey and Europe, establishing a highway and nonstop rail corridor from Basra to London. Expected to be completed by 2028, the project’s initial estimated cost of $17 billion is now projected to reach $24 billion. A significant advantage of the Development Road is its speed and efficiency, offering a 10-day time saving over the Suez Canal for transporting goods from Al-Faw to the European market, thereby providing a considerable edge over the Indo-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
However, the implementation of this project has significant implications for non-state actors, including the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), the Kurdish independence movement in Bakur (Turkish Kurdistan), and the consolidation of Turkish influence over Mosul Velayat (Province).
From the beginning of 2024, Turkey, the Iraqi central government, and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) have been planning a major military operation to secure the route and address Turkey’s concerns, with the stated goal of countering the presence of the PKK in northern Iraq.
The Iraqi central government’s apparent indifference to Turkey’s extensive incursion and violation of Iraqi sovereignty, coupled with its designation of the PKK as an illegal organisation, suggests significant expectations from both the Iraqi government and the KDP regarding this project. Although the Development Road largely bypasses the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) due to its mountainous terrain, it aligns with KDP interests by supporting the Baghdad-Erbil oil export agreement and reducing the costs of imported goods. This has, however, led to opposition from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).
While the Development Road’s benefits for Turkey could diminish Iran’s logistical routes for supplying weapons to its proxy forces and thereby reduce its influence, Turkish Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, during a meeting with the Foreign Policy Committee of Justice and Development Party (AKP) representatives in parliament stated:
“Iran initially opposed the Development Road Project. However, after discussions with Tehran, Iran has now shifted its stance and supports the initiative.” Fidan noted that Iranian authorities were reminded of the global sanctions against them and were convinced that this project could provide a way to alleviate some of the pressure. Iran has since agreed to participate in the project, which Fidan emphasised will be a “significant undertaking for all countries in the region”.
Nevertheless, the Development Road project appears to be strategically aligned with Turkey’s interests. Zagros Hiwa, a spokesperson for the PKK’s umbrella political organisation, the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), highlighted Turkey’s long-term obstruction of water flow from the crucial Euphrates and Tigris rivers to Syria and Iraq. Hiwa argues that Turkey aims to exploit Iraq’s resources and transform the country into a market for Turkish goods.
The potential of the Development Road has prompted Iraqi government officials to follow contradictory responses regarding the Turkish invasion. This complexity is compounded by Iraq’s efforts to mediate between Turkey and Syria while concurrently managing its own internal challenges.
