In a recent interview with Özgür Politika, Kurdish political analyst Kamal Chomani discusses the Kurdistan Democratic Party’s (KDP) resistance to holding elections in Iraqi Kurdistan amidst economic crisis and political deadlock. He highlighted international pressure, scrutiny and allegations against the ruling Barzani family and asserted that the KDP’s manipulation of minority seats and its undemocratic practices have undermined legitimate governance in the region.
Chomani is a long-term critic of the rising authoritarianism in Iraqi Kurdistan, and of the Iraqi Federal government’s green light for Turkish attacks on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) on Iraqi territory.
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“The KDP fears that it cannot rig the upcoming elections due to real international pressure.”
While the Kurdistan Region is facing an economic crisis due to border closures, loss of oil revenue and corruption in trade, it is also drifting into a political deadlock with the KDP’s refusal to hold timely elections. Why does the KDP not want to hold elections?
Kamal Chomani: First of all, no authoritarian power holds elections unless it is certain of the outcome. Authoritarian regimes around the world mimic democracy by holding elections solely to legitimise themselves.
Let me answer your question with a popular joke in the Kurdistan Region about the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP): The KDP claims, “We can even win elections against China.” Ever since the first elections were held in the Kurdistan Region in 1992, they have neither been free nor fair, neither democratic nor even semi-democratic. The KDP has consistently rigged the elections, and this is also true for the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), albeit to a lesser extent.
“If the elections are free, fair and democratic, the KDP is unlikely to win more than 25 out of 100 seats.”
Currently, the KDP fears that it cannot rig the upcoming elections due to real international pressure and the oversight of the Iraqi government through its Higher Commission of Elections. The Kurdistan Region’s Higher Commission of Elections was dissolved for being unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Iraqi Supreme Court dismantled the quotas for minorities, which is a significant factor. The Kurdistan Parliament has 111 seats, of which 11 are reserved for minorities. However, these minority seats have been exploited by the KDP, which has imposed its own candidates within minority communities and used its militia to secure votes for them, ensuring minority representation is aligned with the KDP. This manipulation has been criticised by both the minorities and other Kurdish political parties.
The Iraqi Supreme Court’s dissolution of the minority seats is being contested by the KDP. If the Iraqi Higher Commission of Elections, with logistical support from the United Nations and the international community, conducts the elections, the KDP’s chances of winning will be significantly reduced. In fact, if the elections are free, fair and democratic, the KDP is unlikely to win more than 25 out of 100 seats.
“The ongoing case against the Barzanis marks a significant and unprecedented development in Kurdish politics.”
In the United States, there is an ongoing case against the Barzanis that includes allegations of everything from money laundering and using politics for corruption to murder. Will this situation particularly affect elections in Hewlêr (Erbil) and Duhok?
Kamal Chomani: The ongoing case against members of the Barzani family and top KDP politicians marks a significant and unprecedented development in Kurdish politics. For the first time, over 400 pages of documents detailing political and financial crimes, as well as crimes against humanity, have been submitted to a court. This move highlights the Kurdish population’s desperation for justice against those who have committed crimes since they began ruling the Kurdistan Region following the 1991 Kurdish Uprising.
The 400+ pages of documents have not yet been translated into Kurdish. Given that the media is largely controlled by the KDP and PUK, and that opposition media has not engaged with these documents, the public remains uninformed. Once these documents are translated, they will provide Kurdish society with a clearer understanding of their history and the political and economic realities they face.
However, it is worth noting that voters may not need these documents to inform their decisions in the upcoming elections. The KDP’s rule over the past three decades has already revealed its brutality and true nature. The Kurdish people have witnessed enough to make informed decisions without requiring additional proof.
The Iraqi Supreme Court has ruled that elections in the Kurdistan Region should be held in June. Following this, the KDP’s objections and subsequent meetings with Shia coalitions led by Maliki and contacts with Iran resulted in a decision to freeze the elections. Can the elections be held on time?
Kamal Chomani: Since the first general elections in 1992, the Kurdistan Region has conducted only five elections, none of which were held on time. Elections have consistently been postponed and delayed for unfounded reasons, with the exception of the mid-1990s due to the internal conflict between the KDP and PUK. The upcoming elections have already been delayed, and it is unlikely they will take place in July or August as planned. While there is a possibility that the elections might be held in December, it is more probable that they will be postponed until April 2025 or even later. This pattern of delays undermines the democratic process and reflects the ongoing challenges within the Kurdistan Region’s political system.
“The KDP acts as a detrimental force within the Kurdish nation, focused solely on its own interests rather than those of the Kurdistan Region.”
Taking into account the unwarranted postponement of parliamentary elections, the Iraqi Supreme Court has deemed the Kurdistan Parliament and its decisions since 2022 illegal. If the elections are not held on time, how will this affect Kurdistan?
Kamal Chomani: The Kurdistan Region suffers from illegitimate institutions. None of the higher institutions in the Kurdistan Region are currently legal, as the parliament has dissolved itself. According to the law, once the current parliament is dissolved, the presidency of the Kurdistan Region also becomes illegitimate. Consequently, the Kurdistan Regional Government should function as an interim government. However, our politicians show little concern for the legality of institutions, knowing their political legitimacy is coerced with minimal consent from the populace. This issue is central to my PhD research.
Kurdish politicians benefit from the instability of the Iraqi government. If Iraq were more stable, it could reclaim much of the authority it has lost in the Kurdistan Region. Unfortunately, some people in the Kurdistan Region wish for greater involvement from the central government in regional politics, although I doubt the Iraqi government will act on this desire. Nevertheless, the Iraqi Supreme Court, currently the most legitimate and democratic institution, may pursue more lawsuits against the Kurdistan Region’s institutions if elections are not held promptly. While the Iraqi state is weak now, it will not miss an opportunity to address the Kurdistan Region’s continued undermining of democratic principles and failure to adhere to the Iraqi Constitution. This includes holding elections, a demand from the people, the Iraqi government, Kurdish political parties (except the KDP), the United Nations, and the international community.
“The Kurdistan Region suffers from illegitimate institutions. None of the higher institutions in the Kurdistan Region are currently legal.”
While the KDP is withdrawing from Article 140 regions, particularly Kirkuk and Maxmur, it is now acting in concert with Maliki in Baghdad to delay the elections. How should this be interpreted?
Kamal Chomani: The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) is highly pragmatic, operating without principles or ideals, focused solely on its own interests rather than those of the Kurdistan Region. The KDP perceives any gains made by other Kurdish political parties—whether in Kirkuk, Erbil, Qamishli, Amed, Istanbul, Ankara, Washington, Berlin or any other part of the world—as existential threats. Consequently, the KDP consistently opposes the successes of other political parties.
The KDP acts as a detrimental force within the Kurdish nation. Many Kurds, driven by nationalist sentiments, fail to recognise the true nature of the KDP, which is a tribal, feudal political party serving the interests of Kurdish adversaries. Historically, the KDP has functioned as a proxy party for Iran or Turkey, undermining Kurdish unity and the Kurdish freedom movement in other parts of Kurdistan. Since the emergence of its rival in Kurdish politics in 1975, the KDP has primarily fought against other Kurds rather than Kurdish enemies. This includes collaborating with the Iranian army against Kurds in Iran during the 1980s, clashing with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, and confronting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the 1990s. Currently, the KDP acts as a proxy for Turkey, undermining Kurdish gains in Rojava and Bakur.
The PUK wants the elections to be held on time and without a quota system. Bafel Jalal Talabani consistently emphasises this in his talks with the US. Can the PUK change Baghdad’s decision to freeze the elections?
Kamal Chomani: The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) finds itself in a stronger position now and therefore wants to hold elections. However, I doubt the PUK can influence Baghdad’s decision effectively. If the KDP refuses to participate in the elections, they can sabotage the process. Baghdad is reluctant to impose its will, as the KDP uses nationalist rhetoric to oppose the Iraqi Supreme Court’s decisions.
Overall, I believe Baghdad has the support of the international community to push for holding elections. The PUK, Baghdad and the international community might accept a delay of a few more months to ensure the KDP’s participation. This strategy aims to create a more inclusive and stable electoral process.
The KDP is striving to create an image that everything is going well. Given its heavy reliance on Turkey and Erdoğan, how do you see the future of the KDP?
Kamal Chomani: The KDP has captured the state in the Kurdistan Region much like Erdoğan has in Turkey. In Aristotelian terms, the KDP does not rule by law but by force. Consequently, I do not believe the KDP will have a promising future if democracy is established in the Kurdistan Region and the broader region. Kurdish political parties and people across all parts of Kurdistan should unite to resist the KDP’s feudal politics. Overcoming the KDP is also a step toward overcoming Kurdish adversaries in Turkey, strengthening the Kurdish cause and moving in the right direction.
As a democratic political party, the KDP does not have a bright future. However, as a feudal militia force acting as a proxy for Turkey, it will maintain its influence as long as Iraq remains unstable, Erdoğan stays in power, and the Kurds fail to unite. It is unfortunate that Kurdish progressive forces and voices cannot come together and often surrender to the KDP’s undemocratic ambitions.
Through the Development Road project, the Erdoğan regime ensured that Iraq classified the PKK as a ‘prohibited organisation’. This project, a joint initiative of Iraq, Qatar, the UAE and Turkey, clashes with Saudi Arabia’s plans. What impact do you think the Development Road Project will have on Turkey-Iraq relations and Turkey-KDP relations?
Kamal Chomani: The Development Road project appears very promising, offering significant leverage to Iraq over Turkey. Both countries need this commercial road to expand their economic influence. However, unresolved water issues between the two nations undermine the project’s feasibility. While the project can foster cooperation and better relations, it does not address critical short-term issues, notably Turkey’s military presence in Iraqi territories and the resolution of water disputes.
Iraq is a substantial market for Turkey and is becoming a major tourism destination. There is significant potential for enhancing trade relations between the two countries, but this may come at the expense of the Kurdistan Region, or more specifically, the KDP. Turkey continues to support the KDP because it is the only force fully collaborating with the Turkish army and intelligence services (MIT) against the PKK. Neither Iraq nor other Kurdish political parties have cooperated with the Turkish army in the conflict against the PKK in the mountainous areas between Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey.
Iraq has no interest in becoming a party in the fight against the PKK. Despite its rivalry with the PKK, Iran, which wields significant influence over Baghdad, recognises that the removal of the PKK from the Qandil mountains could lead to Islamist terrorists establishing bases there, posing an existential threat to Kurdistan and Iran.
Therefore, Turkey and Iraq can only cooperate and expand their economic partnership if they address security and economic issues separately. Iraq should not and has not become involved in Turkey’s conflict with the Kurds. There is also broad support within Iraq for the Kurdish freedom movement in Turkey, and there Iraq should approach the PKK issue with sensitivity.
Turkish products, capital and companies have already dominated the Kurdish market, with the Erdoğan family benefiting significantly from Kurdish oil. Consequently, while the KDP may not welcome further partnerships between Baghdad and Ankara, it is powerless to oppose them. In the long run, if implemented, the Development Road project could benefit both countries and their populations. However, without peace in the Kurdish regions of Turkey, the borders will remain unsafe, and the development project will likely not succeed.
