“The owners of the telephone numbers +905331637955 and +902127090343 were on French soil between August 30, 2012 and January 20, 2013. There is little doubt that these numbers belong to two Turkish intelligence officers who met with Güney and gave him his orders. Even the names of these two men are not unknown,” writes Ferda Çetin for Yeni Özgür Politika.
Last week saw demonstrations in France and around the world on the anniversary of the Paris Massacre. Thousands of people carrying photographs of Sakine Cansız, Fidan Doğan and Leyla Şaylemez demanded the same thing: Do not cover up the Paris murders, bring the Paris Massacre to light!
Jean-Louis Malterre, one of the lawyers in the case where three revolutionary Kurdish women were murdered, made important comments on the anniversary of the killings, saying the French government was trying not to disturb the Turkish authorities.
“They do not wish to inconvenience the Turkish government, that is why they do not lift the confidentiality order on the case or make any advances in the investigation. French intelligence has been in close cooperation with the Turkish authorities and the secret service. The French government has a responsibility in this triple murder,” Malterre said.
At this point, the amount of information that has been revealed and documents that have been added to the case file is so much larger than what remains unknown. There is sufficient evidence to finalise the case. Prosecutors Jeanne Duye, Christophe Teissier and Laurence Le Vert have prepared an indictment that includes very important information that is clearly visible but still remains undiscussed.
Ömer Güney, the man who pulled the trigger, was visited in prison on 4 Jan 2014 by a former colleague from Germany, Ruhi Semen, and his son Ümit Semen. French intelligence and police made detailed preparations as the visit had to be registered in advance. It clearly states in the indictment that the room they held the visit in was fitted with listening devices and cameras. Intelligence services monitored the visit in its entirety.
During the visit, Güney gave Ruhi Semen a piece of paper. The authorities monitoring the visit do not stop him, or search Semen after the meeting to confiscate the note. He was allowed to leave with it. The indictment cites the incident as follows:
“Officials in the investigation failed in their efforts to confiscate the piece of paper. Ruhi Semen responded to a phone call and promised to go to the counterterrorism department (SDAT) offices in LEVALLOIS-PERRET the next day (on Sunday), but he chose to flee and he took off for Germany.”
What happened next?
French intelligence sought assistance from the German police, telling them that Ruhi Semen took an important document from Güney during the visit and fled to Germany with that document on his person. They asked German authorities to question Semen and find the document.
French police probably thought their German counterparts would not take this odd request seriously, or that Semen would have already disposed of the document. This was not the case. German police held a serious investigation, searching Semen’s home and took detailed statements from him. In an old phone they discovered deleted photos and inspected them. Among the photos was one that showed the note Güney gave him.
The note detailed a plan for a meeting with Turkish intelligence in Ankara and how to break him out during a visit to a hospital. Semen also made a confession, which was added to the indictment in its entirety.
French public officials clearly and deliberately failed to fulfil their duties and helped protect a criminal, aiding his attempt to flee.
French domestic and foreign intelligence and police, from top to bottom, acts like this scandal never happened when it should require their resignations. Such an incident should not happen under basic security measures, let alone in an extraordinarily secured prison.
As the Paris case continued, two more crimes were committed. The first was public officials abusing their position, and the second Güney’s attempt to escape. Prosecutors disregarded these critical crimes, dismissing them as insignificant.
French intelligence and police did not share with the court the documents they had, and knowingly avoided gathering information that was easy to obtain. This is abundantly clear.
Güney used several phone numbers during his time in France. Some of these numbers, namely +905382475849, +33669647591 and +31623484269, were understood to be “special” numbers. French police determined every time these numbers were used and all numbers they communicated with. This information has been included in the indictment.
However, the French Domestic Security Directorate General (DGSI), the Foreign Security Directorate General (DGSE) and the criminal police organisation have put on a play of obfuscation, and demanding from Turkish courts and intelligence information on Güney’s phone calls made from Turkey. Turkish authorities have yet to respond to any of these demands to date.
As such, French intelligence and the judiciary have effectively passed the ball on to the Turkish side, absolving themselves of responsibility and protecting the commercial interests between the two countries as Malterre stated.
The stalling game between high level intelligence services is so clear that not even the DGSI, DGSE and the MİT combined could keep up this shoddy behaviour.
A random person on the street would know that phone calls made in France reach Turkey via base stations, phone networks and satellites. So, what logic would it have that French authorities demand information on phone calls that they could decipher themselves?
The number Güney called most frequently in Turkey was +905382756302, from his Dutch +31623484269 number.
So, could Dutch and French police forces, in their infinite ability to tap the phones of Kurdish associations, politicians and shopkeepers, not obtain phone records for Güney? French intelligence did not even submit a request to this end from their Dutch counterparts. There is no such request cited in the indictment. Why not?
The owners of the numbers +905331637955 and +902127090343 were on French soil between August 30, 2012 and January 20, 2013. There is little doubt that these numbers belong to two Turkish intelligence officers who met with Güney and gave him his orders. Even the names of these two men are not unknown. Two member of the Turkish MİT who are prisoners of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) have also confessed to receiving promotions to department chiefs after the massacre.
All this is evidence that French domestic and foreign intelligence authorities and French police have committed crimes as public servants. This is not mere negligence, but an abuse of power, as it was committed knowingly and deliberately.
As the case for the Paris Massacre continues, if the French public servants who have abused their positions and not submitted to the court the documents they could have obtained are not discussed as an important factor, this historic case will not be able to have a just conclusion.