Rethinking coexistence in Turkey: Öcalan’s call for a new Social Contract

Sinan Önal

Since the onset of a reconciliation process in October 2024, Turkey has been experiencing a cautious yet continuous shift towards renewed dialogue. Despite widespread scepticism fuelled by the ruling government’s past decade of failed peace initiatives—most notably the collapse of negotiations between 2013 and 2015—developments have continued step by step. Public distrust remains high, given the long history of broken promises dating back to 1993. However, the renewed commitment of Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned Kurdish leader and central architect of past negotiations, marks a significant shift. His determination remains steadfast despite the recent loss of his trusted intermediary, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, whose vibrant personality and unique capacity for mediation had played a vital role in earlier phases of this process.

Since October, there have been eight meetings with Öcalan—following a 43-month period of absolute incommunicado detention during a total 26 years of predominantly isolated detention—marking a significant shift in the political climate. In his most recent meeting on 18 May, Öcalan reiterated his call for a democratic reconciliation process rooted in a redefined social contract.

A call beyond peace: The framework of a New Contract

In his most recent message, dated 18 May and conveyed via the İmralı delegation, Öcalan called for a “new contract based on the law of brotherhood”. This call is not merely a plea for peace but a radical intervention that unsettles the foundations of Turkish citizenship, nationalism, and the state’s ideological scaffolding. His proposal has been met with diverse responses, notably from Mümtaz’er Türköne, a conservative intellectual once associated with nationalist currents, who drew parallels between Öcalan’s statement and the philosophical lineage of the social contract. These convergences highlight an emerging rupture with what Barış Ünlü has termed the “Türklük Sözleşmesi” (Turkishness Contract), a tacit yet potent mechanism that has historically regulated Turkish identity by excluding and denying difference.

Barış Ünlü’s influential analysis conceptualises Turkish identity as more than a legal or civic status. It operates as an embodied contract requiring individuals—especially Kurds, Alevis, Armenians, and other minorities—to participate in a hegemonic narrative by erasing their distinct identities. This performative framework sustains a version of Turkishness rooted in Sunni, ethnically Turkish, and nationalist ideals, and marginalises those who do not conform. Ünlü writes:

 “A person shaped by Turkishness constantly sees certain things while never seeing others; constantly becomes informed about certain things while remaining uninformed about others; constantly feels emotions about certain things while remaining indifferent to others.”

In stark contrast, Öcalan’s most recent intervention rejects this model entirely. He reframes the longstanding conflict not simply as a political impasse but as a fractured kinship between Turks and Kurds.

 Declaring, "What has been broken is the sibling relationship... we are repairing the roads and bridges," Öcalan positions reconciliation as an ethical and relational imperative. His call for a new social contract implies a paradigmatic shift: one that decentres state ideology in favour of mutual recognition, equal dignity, and democratic coexistence among diverse peoples.

Unexpected convergences: Türköne reads Rousseau with Öcalan

Surprisingly, Türköne’s article titled ‘A New Contract’ aligns with this vision. Historically known for his nationalist conservatism, Türköne now engages Öcalan’s framing through the lens of Rousseau’s social contract theory. He argues that Öcalan’s proposal reorients negotiations away from a statist paradigm, proposing instead a foundational agreement between peoples—Kurds and Turks as co-equals. Importantly, this concept situates the people, not the state, as the sovereign authors of political legitimacy. Such a framing challenges long-standing narratives that centralise the state as the sole arbiter of unity and law.

Within the context of Turkey’s political culture, this is a radical shift. The traditional state model, often inspired by Hobbesian principles of authority and order, has historically sanctioned the repression of Kurdish identity in the name of cohesion. Rousseau’s model, which Türköne invokes, foregrounds consent, equality, and popular sovereignty. He reminds readers that in Rousseau’s theory, the state is not a signatory to the social contract; it exists only to serve the general will of free and equal individuals.

Toward an egalitarian future

This intellectual and political shift—towards a people-centred, egalitarian contract—carries profound implications. It begins to unsettle the assumptions of the Türklük Sözleşmesi by opening space for real coexistence rather than hierarchical tolerance.

When Türköne challenges Turkish society to meet the Kurds as equals, he echoes, whether intentionally or not, the central critique advanced by Ünlü: that Turkish identity has long depended on systemic erasure and enforced silence. As Ünlü succinctly puts it, “Turkishness can only survive through ignorance.” (Türklük Sözleşmesi, p.60)

The evolution of Öcalan’s thought is central to this shift. From his early days as a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary to his later writings on democratic confederalism, Öcalan has increasingly turned toward non-statist, participatory models of political organisation. His appeal for a new contract is grounded in the PKK’s recent 12th Congress decision to end armed struggle and embrace peaceful political engagement. The message also gestures towards transnational solidarity, referencing figures such as Alain Badiou and Slavoj Žižek, and calling for a global struggle rooted not in nationalism but in radical democracy.

In Öcalan’s framework, the nation is reimagined not as an exclusive ethnic or religious community but as a voluntary association of equals and diversified and democratic in unity, mostly named as ”democratic nation”. Cultural and linguistic diversity is not a threat to unity but a resource for democratic flourishing.

 Öcalan's metaphor of rebuilding roads and bridges speaks to the material and symbolic work required to mend the fractures created by the Türklük Sözleşmesi.

This work cannot rest solely with Kurds or their representatives. As Türköne notes, genuine peace demands reciprocal transformation. The Turkish public must grapple with its complicity in perpetuating the status quo. Recognition of Kurdish language rights, constitutional reform, and meaningful guarantees of equality are not concessions but preconditions for a new, inclusive national contract. As Ünlü notes, many of the negative aspects of Turkishness are unconsciously enacted through what he terms the “contracts of insensitivity and ignorance”, reinforcing structural exclusion.

The present moment—characterised by the PKK’s disarmament, renewed parliamentary engagement, and cautious international support—presents a unique historical opportunity. The European Union’s interest in the peace process could play a facilitating role, if translated into actionable political support and legal frameworks.

What is at stake is not merely the resolution of an armed conflict but the redefinition of the political community itself. The dismantling of the Türklük Sözleşmesi and the tentative emergence of a pluralistic, inclusive social contract suggest not the dissolution of the Republic but its possible democratic rebirth.

Rousseau’s oft-quoted line—”Man is born free, yet everywhere he is in chains”—finds renewed relevance in Turkey’s current juncture. The challenge now is whether Turkish society can unshackle itself from historical denial and embrace a vision of democratic renewal built on mutual recognition and equal dignity.

*Sinan Önal is a political scientist, currently an envoy of the Kurdistan National Congress (KNK), who formerly acted as an adviser in policy-building and international affairs to the left-wing alternative and pro-Kurdish parties DTP, BDP, and HDP in Turkey. Mr Önal also represented the pro-Kurdish party in the United States in 2012/2013, and in Germany in 2017/2018.