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Meral Çiçek
“Today the political parties represented in the Kurdistan Regional Parliament neither have a common policy, nor a common purpose nor a common program or an understanding regarding the regions of dispute (especially Kirkuk and Sinjar) and neither regarding the whole of Iraq in general. This multipartional situation is what endangers the status of the South most,” writes Meral Çiçek for Yeni Özgür Politika.
With its official name “Kurdistan Region”, the Bashûrê [South] Kurdistan has been developing its autonomy since 1991. The main developments that led to such autonomy can be listed as follows: People’s uprisings in southern Iraq and in northern Iraq; following the end of the Gulf War, the U.S., Britain and France announcing the no-fly zones; and the Baath regime pulling forces back from the region.
Under such circumstances, the first election was held in the South in 1992 which led to the establishment of the parliaments and the government. This is the birth story of the status of the Kurdistan Regional Governemnt, which was officially recognised by the Iraqi Constitution in 2005.
However, after the election, in which the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) almost collected equal number of votes, some problems have begun to unfold. These problems turned into a civil war in 1994 that was called ‘şerê birakujî’ by the Kurds.
The KDP has brought back the tanks of the Saddam regime and with the help of Baathists, they entered and took control of Erbil (Hewlêr), which was controlled by the PUK then.
The ceasefire between the two forces, which was announced in 1997, became permanent with the Washington Convention in September 1998.
In the 20 years period of time that passed after that, the reality of the birakujî (brothers’ war) and internal power conflicts have not yet been put behind. The debate of seperating the administrations of the KDP and PUK have been re-opened again and again in the last period.
Actually, the common ground on which the status of the South leans upon is the joint administration.
However, the grounds that these debates rise from is the sharing of the political area and income that the KDP seeks for itself.
So the real question here is caused by monopolist, centralist and self-seeking policies.
When this is the circumstances of the inner conflicts in the Kurdistan region, this narrow self-seeking approach is an issue that weakens the hand of the South in their relationship with Baghdad.
Today the political parties represented in the Kurdistan Regional Parliament neither have a common policy, nor a common purpose nor a common program or an understanding regarding the regions of dispute (especially Kirkuk and Sinjar) and neither regarding the whole of Iraq in general. This multipartional situation is what endangers the status of the South most.
Therefore, accusing the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) of ‘attempting to shatter the status of the Kurdistan Region’ can only be a sign of impotency. The top-names in the PKK have repeatedly stated that they are not against the status of the South and that they accept the South and the peshmerga. Yet, with the cheapest demagogies the realities are tried to be covered up.
Just like Gobbels said, “Repeat a lie often enough and it becomes the truth,” the lie that the PKK guerilla have attacked the KDP peshmerga have been repeated over and over again.
And in the same way, the untruthful discourse that the PKK does not recognise the status of the Kurdistan Region and even tries to weaken it and that is why it is a threat to the South is repeatedly wheeled out.
Those who try to create a perception that ‘the PKK attempts to shatter the status of Kurdistan Region’ are the ones responsible of the threats and dangers that Bashuri Kurdistan is face to face with.
If they were so worried about the status of the South, they would first change their stance towards the policy of the democratic national unity for as much as the multipartional situation of the Kurds, this is the greatest threat against the status of the Kurds.
