Sarah Glynn
Last Saturday’s Kurdish Unity Conference made a powerful call for the recognition of ethnic and religious diversity and for the decentralisation of political power. The vital importance of its message for a future peaceful Syria has already been put into focus by the sectarian massacre of Alawites in western Syria, which was carried out in March. This week, that message was made even more urgent by fatal sectarian attacks against the Druze communities in the south.
A conference for unity
Before examining this week’s events and the different forces behind them, I want to look briefly at the call of the Unity Conference, and at the reaction to it. Last week, I looked at the difficulties of bringing the Kurdish parties together The fact that, despite this, they united behind a single statement, gives that statement extra force. Both the wide popular support, and the organisation and discipline behind the conference make it impossible to ignore. The conference statement itself held no surprises. It provided a dignified demand for an inclusive, democratic, and decentralised Syria.
words of Bedran Çiya Kurd of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria’s Executive Council, “The unification of the Kurdish political discourse is both a strategic and urgent necessity” that will “generate a more effective political and social force in the Syrian political landscape.” It will “contribute to uniting the Syrian people, unifying their ranks, and establishing a just democratic system of government for all Syrians.”
The reaction from Syria’s Interim Government was predictably negative, reflecting their dependence on Turkey. They claim that the statement goes against the spirit of their own agreement, made on 10 March, with the Autonomous Administration’s Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). However, that agreement is deliberately open to interpretation, and was (nevertheless) clearly abused in the government’s own unilateral decisions over an interim constitution. The government say they want to see a solution ‘based directly on the will of the people’ while denying that will; and they attempt to claim that the SDF are denying different identities, when that is what the Kurdish agreement is all about.
There is still a long way to go before the statement’s ideas can be realised, but the conference gives them firm foundations that can be built on.
The Druze
The agreed conference statement describes Syria as “a country of multiple nationalities, cultures, religions, and sects”, and specifically mentions the Druze in its list of the country’s component peoples. Druze politicians and activists were already interested in the Kurdish model of autonomy before the fall of Assad, and along with other minority groups, they have been monitoring the interactions between the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria and the Interim Syrian Government, and the attempt by the Autonomous Administration to retain autonomy.
As a small minority whose religion makes them a target of hardline Islamists, the Druze have found themselves in difficult positions. Druze critical of Assad’s rule could not expect salvation through the Islamist opposition; and now they are worried about their relationship with the new Interim government. Different views over how to respond to these positions has led to the development of different political factions within the community, which have coalesced around different traditional leaders and their personal ambitions.
During Syria’s civil war, most Druze avoided the conflict between the government and the main Islamist opposition groups, preferring to establish their own militias to defend their region against ISIS or other attackers. Today, they have good reason to be wary of the Interim Government, having suffered mass killings at the hands of Al Nusra Front, the predecessor organisation of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the group now in control.
The most powerful of the Druze leaders is Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, who inherited his post in 2012. For many years, al-Hijri professed support for Bashar al-Assad’s Syrian Government – losing popularity as a result – but from 2020, he pivoted towards opposition, and in 2023 he gave his strong support to the anti-government protests in Druze-majority Suwayda, which were spurred by government corruption and economic hardship.
Last December, when the Assad regime crumbled as HTS attacked from the north, the Druze militias drove the regime forces from Suwayda. For the last five months, since HTS took control in Damascus, relations with the new Syrian authorities have been uneasy. Like the Kurds, the Druze have not been reassured by the actions of the Interim Government – by their dismissal of secularism and prioritisation of Islam, by their insistence on centralisation, by their promotion of their own people at the expense of other groups and of democracy, and by their failure to prevent sectarianism and violence. Without guarantees of cultural and religious rights, of political participation, or even of safety, they are not prepared to become totally subsumed in the new government. This has led to various standoffs.
Israel, ever ready to weaken Syria, and especially to put hurdles in the way of its Islamist government, has offered to help the Druze resist Damascus – an offer that all but a few Druze firmly refuse. Even this suggestion of Israeli “friendship” exacerbates distrust of the Druze.
Syria is awash with armed men, high on a diet of Islamic supremacy. And the country’s economic catastrophe, the product of years of corruption and war and of harsh US sanctions, generates frustrations that can easily be redirected towards easier targets. It did not take much to trigger sectarian violence against the Druze minority.
A week of anti-Druze sectarianism
Earlier this year, when an unidentified gunman killed a member of the Interim Government’s security forces in Jaramana, the government responded with mass arrests. This time, the catalyst for anti-Druze sectarianism was an audio tape purporting to be a Druze sheikh insulting Muhammad. The sheikh denied any connection with the recording, and the Druze authorities were firm in their disapproval of any such insults, but the damage had already been done.
The first reports of sectarian violence came on Sunday from Homs, where students from Homs and Damascus stormed the dormitory of students from Suwayda.
By Tuesday, Jaramana, just southeast of Damascus, was being attacked by gunmen and heavy weapons, and Druze militias were fighting back. Soon, the fighting had spread to Sahnaya, south of Damascus, and adjacent Ashrafiyat Sahnaya. On Wednesday, following an announcement of a peace agreement on Tuesday night, there were reports of clashes in towns and villages in the southern province of Suwayda, and an ambush by government forces killed 42 people on their way from Suwayda to support their co-religionists in Sahnaya. Government forces took control of Ashrafiyat Sahnaya and made mass arrests. And Israel carried out a warning strike against a group preparing to attack the Druze in Sahnaya.
A second peace agreement was announced on Wednesday night, but more villages were attacked on Thursday.
A third agreement was reached on Thursday night, in which it was stated that the internal security forces in the Druze region would be recruited locally – inviting parallels with the agreement made with the Autonomous Administration with respect to the Kurdish majority neighbourhoods in Aleppo, so again highlighting the importance of the Kurdish model.
The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights described the situation yesterday as one of tense calm, after a week in which they counted 109 deaths. However there have also been reports of a major split between Druze leaders, with the leader of a minority faction being expelled from Suwayda after being accused of being too close to the Interim Government.
All the while there have been videos circulating showing rallies that call for the extermination of the Druze, and government-linked fighters repeating violent sectarian slogans and humiliating their prisoners by cutting off their moustaches.
Although the Interim Government is fully supportive of its forces and is blaming the Druze for the violence, this has not been a planned and coordinated campaign. As in the attacks on the Alawites, there appears to have been a free-for-all for the different military groups that have become part of the Syrian Army and that want to indulge in sectarian violence. In the case of the Druze, they couldn’t just go on the rampage because the Druze have well-prepared defence militias.
At the same time, attacks are still being perpetrated against the Alawites. Only yesterday, government-linked troops raided a predominantly Alawite village, sabotaging and looting and causing fear among the inhabitants.
Israel and Turkey
Yesterday morning, Israeli fighter jets struck close to the presidential palace in Damascus. This was a show of power, and a warning to the Interim President, Ahmed al-Sharaa, not to attack the Druze areas further. It was not a response to Druze requests – the Druze have rejected Israeli interference.
Israel regards the Druze, and also the Kurds, as a useful buffer, as a counter to Turkish and Islamist dominance, and as a potential wedge that might be used to destroy Syrian unity. Israel’s Finance Minister, Bezalel Smotrich, claimed last week that Israel won’t stop fighting till Syria is divided.
Israel has also used last week’s attacks on the Druze as an excuse for another devastating round of airstrikes against Syrian military sites, which was launched yesterday evening. This is part of Israel’s plan for military domination through the pre-emptive crushing of any possible opposition. It has also effectively demonstrated the hollowness of Turkish claims to regional dominance. Turkish planes flew into Syrian airspace and then flew out again. They do not want war with Israel and there was nothing they could do to stop the Israeli attacks, which even targeted Idlib. Yesterday was an important day for the region’s geopolitics.
Turkey is not happy with this Israeli competition, but in their own determination to dominate, and to deny any significant role to the Kurds, they too are weakening Syria. Their insistence on destroying all Kurdish achievements and on maintaining the Interim Government’s centralised dictatorial control is a recipe for unrest and division.
This week Turkey has appeared to be attempting to undermine the agreement over the Tishreen Dam. They have been carrying out drone strikes again, and one of these strikes killed a woman fighter from the SDF. One of Turkey’s mercenary militias attempted to infiltrate across the frontline, losing a fighter to the SDF defence. Turkey is also continuing to deprive Syria of their share of river water, and there have been warnings that the Euphrates Dam’s turbines may have to be shut down. A new rreport by Rojava Information Centre details the many war crimes committed by Turkey and their mercenary militias in Syria since the fall of Assad in December.
The view from the Syrian Democratic Council
The statement by North and East Syria’s Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) on the violence in the Druze region makes clear that they hold the Damascus authorities “fully responsible for the escalation and deterioration of the situation.” They believe that “the use of excessive force will push Syria closer to collapse and deepen the divisions created by the former al-Assad regime”, and that this will invite other countries to exploit the situation to destabilise and dominate Syria and to undermine Syrian sovereignty and unity. To avert this, they call for a “truly inclusive” national conference to “lay the foundation for a modern, democratic constitution.”
Sarah Glynn is a writer and activist – check her website and follow her on Twitter or bluesky
