writes Ali Sinemilli for the daily Yeni Yaşam.he KDP wants to leave Rojava breathless by closing the Sêmelka Border crossing, because the KDP wants to make the revolutionary forces take a step back via blackmailing and threats. However, the KDP miscalculates something and that is: the Rojava Revolution has already passed the stage on which the KDP had set its policy on ten years ago as it proved itself to the enemies and friends,”
The Catalonian Parliament officially recognised the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) on 20 October with a majority of votes. The Parliament of Catalonia was the first parliament to officially recognise the Autonomous Administration, but the decision also caused a controversy.
The Speaker of the Catalonian Parliament, Laura Borras, said that the people of Catalonia support the Kurdish people emphasising that it is very important for the Autonomous Administration to be based on women leaders, social ecology and local administrations.
All eyes turned to the Federal Kurdistan Parliament once again regarding the recognition decision of the Catalonian Parliament.
Some political circles who closely follow the issue, especially the Kurds, claimed that the Kurdistan Parliament should also take such a decision and they have made strident calls for such recognition. However, neither this issue came to the agenda of the parliament nor a serious discussion took place except for some individuals who discussed the matter.
And so, Catalans from the other side of the world supported solidarity for their “Kurdish friends,” but the “Kurds” adjacent to Rojava did not take a single step.
Even though this is hard to comprehend, this was the practice of the KDP, the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
However, it was not surprising for those who know of the dominant political approach in South Kurdistan [refers to Iraqi Kurdistan], but the expectation was that at least not to fall behind the Catalans.
The Kurdistan Parliament could have declared the recognition of the Autonomous Administration the same as the Catalan Parliament and given its support for Rojava. It did not happen, obviously.
Several other issues have aroused outrage and reaction amongst many Kurds to KDP’s rule.
It is known that KDP closed the Sêmelka Border Gate in northeastern Syria between Rojava and South Kurdistan with an unilateral decision.
While everyone was expecting a positive step from the KDP and calling for support from the South Kurdistan, the KDP on the other hand, closed the trade border El Welîd Border Gate.
That does KDP want to do now, what is its purpose? To what ends does the KDP aim to reach with such practices? Whatever reasons the KDP might have, nothing can legitimise or justify such attempts of closing the border.
In this respect, it is important to understand the reason behind their decisions and attempts. Otherwise, it can be easily subjected to manipulation and misunderstanding.
Remember what the KDP President Barzani had said in the process of 2013-2014 when the Rojava revolution took place and triggered great enthusiasm all over the world, especially throughout the Middle East. Barzani said, ‘The PYD [Democratic Union Party] claims to have made a revolution in Rojava. There is no such revolution.’
Alright! What was Barzani’s party doing during this period? They were digging ditches on the Rojava-Bashur border.
It is also known that KDP has built-up its military forces and outposts along with the South Kurdistan and Rojava border. This explains all. The KDP continues with a similar approach to the Rojava revolution, just as it had previously viewed the Rojava Revolution.
The KDP does not consider the Rojava Revolution as a friend, as a fellow administration to form close relations; it rather sees Rojava as a rival to be weakened or taken under control.
The KDP acts with the same motive as it acts in cooperation with the occupying forces in Afrin [Efrin], Tell Abyad [Gire Spî] and Ras al-Ayn [Serêkaniyê] and remains silent about the genocidal practices of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) government of Turkey against Rojava.
In fact, the KDP’s closing of the Sêmelka Border Gate is not independent from its historical actions. It is nothing new; Barzani declared his approach against the Rojava Revolution in the autumn of 2013, and in the meantime has acted based on this policy.
In the final analysis, the KDP wants to leave Rojava breathless by closing the Sêmelka Border crossing, because the KDP wants to make the revolutionary forces take a step back via blackmailing and threats.
However, the KDP miscalculates something and that is: the Rojava Revolution has already passed the stage on which the KDP had set its policy on ten years ago as it proved itself to the enemies and friends.
The revolution is gradually institutionalised both in the political-military and societal basis. In the present conjuncture, neither the KDP nor the forces behind it have the power to eliminate the revolution. Whilst the AKP-KDP cooperation, which has acted as nothing but hostile against the Rojava revolution, increasingly loses power each and every day, the Rojava revolution spreads its roots deeper and grows like a plane tree.