Matt Broomfield
Each day, tension increases between the two power blocs confronting one another on various fronts throughout the Middle East. In the latest conflagration, a deadly blast has claimed scores of lives in Iran, leading to accusations of US involvement and vows of revenge from Iranian leaders. And with each notch that the tension ratchets up, pressure also increases on the non-aligned Kurdish movement, seeking to avoid being drawn into a worsening conflict which can bring no benefit to civilian populations throughout the region, and least of all the stateless Kurds.
These power-blocs are not homogenously defined. Turkey is only the most prominent of a number of states and political actors refusing easy categorisation as either a stalwart ally or subordinate protectorate of the US, or else a member of the axis which styles itself in opposition to the US while furthering expansionist Iranian objectives. Nonetheless, throughout the Middle East there is increasing pressure to pick a side in a confrontation which is only waxing all the more strongly in 2024.
The US’ long-term status as global strongman is wavering in the face of mass regional opposition to Israel’s brutal war of destruction in Gaza and US policy in the region more generally, coupled with domestic war-weariness and indifference over the necessity US power-projection in the region. While the US foothold in the region will not vanish overnight, it has long been eroded, with Iran patiently taking advantage of the chaos and power vacuum caused by the 2003 US invasion of Iraq to achieve major influence over Iraq and other neighbouring states, Syria included. Indeed, Iran feels increasingly emboldened to launch provocative, small-scale assaults on US bases and assets throughout the region.
The US has clearly been hesitant to engage in any escalation in response. But the bombings in Iran occurred just one day after Saleh al-Arouri, the deputy leader of the Palestinian armed group Hamas and a known ally of Iran, was killed in a suspected Israeli drone strike in Beirut, Lebanon. Moreover, the Iran blast occurred during a ceremony at a cemetery commemorating the fourth anniversary of the demise of Qasem Soleimani, the Iranian commander who was a leading light of Iran’s power expansion throughout the Middle East until his death in a 2020 US drone strike.
The precise timing and target of the attack therefore heightened tensions, especially in the midst of the ongoing conflict in Gaza. Following the incident, Iranian officials pointed accusatory fingers at the United States and Israel, vowing retaliation. For its part, the US vehemently denied any involvement in the bombing and rejected the notion of Israeli responsibility, with Washington pointing to the possible role of ISIS or an affiliated Sunni extremist group. And indeed, ISIS has asserted responsibility for the dual explosions that claimed the lives of at least 84 individuals on Wednesday.
But this won’t prevent millions from viewing the attack as part of a continued, uncontrollable escalation, Iran from engaging in more provocative tit-for-tat violence, and the US (or its isolated allies in Tel Aviv) from responding with its own strikes and efforts at countering Iranian influence through proxy warfare. Indeed, spiralling tensions in the Middle East will only create room for more exploitative, terroristic violence. In the current context, incidents like the blast at Soleimani’s funeral were always bound to be conspiratorially interpreted, as proof of either malign US influence (ISIS as US/Israeli creation), or conversely of Iranian evil (with the blast a false-flag attack). ISIS know this full well, and are able to profit from the polarized atmosphere of crisis to pursue their own destructive, violent agenda.
In this atmosphere, the Kurdish movement must use all its guile and resources to avoid being pulled into the fray. In Iran itself, only the Kurdish movement is able to offer genuine resistance to the brutal Tehran regime: but as we saw following US efforts to co-opt the Kurdish-led Women, Life, Freedom (Jin, Jiyan, Azadi) protest movement which arose following the slaying of Jina (Mahsa) Amini, this movement cannot rely on external forces opposed to Iran to offer genuine support for its vision of a decentralized, federal Iran. In Syria, meanwhile, the Kurdish movement continues to tread a tightrope, facing down increasing pressure from Iranian proxy forces and militias while still refusing to be drawn into playing an active role as the mere enforcer of US interests in this crucial region. While the stateless Kurds have been forced to seek accommodations with parties to both sides of the worsening conflict, perhaps the best they can hope for in 2024 is to continue to survive without being drawn deeper into the confrontation.
*Matt Broomfield is a freelance journalist, poet and activist. He writes for VICE, Medya News, the New Statesman and the New Arab; his prose has been published by The Mays, Anti-Heroin Chic and Plenitude; and his poetry by the National Poetry Society, the Independent, and Bare Fiction. His work was displayed across London by Poetry on the Underground, and he is a Foyle Young Poet of the Year.
