Fatih Polat
“Getting involved in the process in Syria was not only an attempt by the AKP to reinforce its domestic support, but also a move in accordance with the inherited traditional objectives of the state. For this reason, it would be too optimistic to expect a new administration after that of the AKP to carry out a complete withdrawal from Syria,” writes Fatih Polat for Evrensel.
Statements by a Turkish official followed President Erdoğan’s remarks signalled an impending military operation against Tall Rifat after two special forces police officers were killed in an attack on a Turkish convoy in northern Syria. The official, speaking to Reuters, indicated that the Turkish military and the National Intelligence Agency (MİT) were preparing for a military operation, and said: ‘They have decided on this, and accordingly they will coordinate it with certain other countries. It will be also negotiated with Russia and the United States.’ The official added that Erdoğan will discuss this issue with Biden during the G20 summit to be held in Rome at the end of October.
Developments so far seem to confirm that the meeting between Erdoğan and Putin in Sochi ended in discord. Russia’s airstrikes in Idlib after the meeting and the insistence of Damascus on a Turkish withdrawal from Syria are manifestations of this. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) administration considers Idlib a key position with regard to its Syria policy, and is trying to retain its mobility on the ground by use of its ‘terrorism’ wild card and a move on Tall Rifat to counteract its difficulty in manoeuvring in Idlib.
Let us make a note at this point. The potential of such a military operation in overcoming the loss of support the AKP administration is suffering domestically is probably one of the main motivations behind Erdoğan’s aforementioned remarks. However, any assessment would be incomplete in terms of historical references if Turkey’s policy with regard to Syria under AKP administrations and the consequent military operations were regarded merely as products of domestic developments or explained as choices made exclusively by the AKP.
A 2007 report by the MİT, released on the 80th anniversary of its foundation, suggested that ‘an active foreign policy’ was required due to changes in regional balances, and hinted at an expansion not limited by the historical ‘National Pact’ [six resolutions reached in the Ottoman Parliament during its last term and published on 12 February 1920]. Senior officials of the administration later showed that they’d actually adopted this stance as a state policy by making statements that Turkey’s right to defend its borders started beyond those borders. Turkey’s current military presence in Syria is essentially an extension of this policy.
To say that the policy of peace expressed with the [the new Turkish Republic’s] motto ‘peace in the country, peace in the world’ was scrapped during the AKP administrations may be meaningful for political agitation, but it is a well-known fact that Turkey has always been interested in territories beyond its borders, especially in the context of its ‘Northern Iraq’ policy.
Following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the 1st World War, the United Kingdom occupied Mosul [in Iraq] and its periphery, rich in oil fields, on 15 November 1918, on grounds allegedly related to article 7 of the Armistice of Mudros. The statement by Mustafa Kemal [founder of the Turkish Republic] on 1 May 1920 after the establishment of the National Assembly has great significance in this context: ‘I would like to emphasise a few things and request that the same issue is not brought forth again: The persons comprising the Assembly are not only Turks or Circassians or Kurds, but a congenial community composed of the four elements of Islam… Our national borders lie to the south of Iskenderun, and contain Mosul, Sulaymaniyah and Kirkuk as it extends towards the east. Thus we have declared that these are our national borders.’
But this objective could not be achieved within the power relations of the time. The ‘Agreement on Borders and Good Neighbourliness Relations’ signed on 5 June 1926 in Ankara by Turkey, the UK and Iraq, ruled that Mosul was within the territory of Iraq and Turkey was to receive 10% of Iraq’s oil revenues for a period of 25 years. In a subsequent agreement Turkey yielded its rights for a payment of GBP 500,000. Modifications in the Turkish state’s traditional Kurdish policy and the vision of developing ties with the Kurds in northern Iraq during the Özal administration [1983-89] was a reflection of Turkey’s search for an ‘active foreign policy’. The statement of Demirel [prime minister 1991-93] on ‘the recognition of the Kurdish reality’ in 1991 coincides with this. When this approach did not have the desired results, the Syrian civil war starting in 2011 presented new grounds for ‘active foreign policy’ objectives. Getting involved in the process in Syria was not only an attempt by the AKP to reinforce its domestic support, but also a move in accordance with the inherited traditional objectives of the state.
For this reason, it would be too optimistic to expect a new administration after that of the AKP to carry out a complete withdrawal from Syria.
Whether or not a military operation targeting Tall Rifat will soon take place and how relations with Russia and the US will play out in this context are questions that will be answered in time. But it is apparent that the Turkish administration, the National Intelligence Agency and the General Command of the Turkish Armed Forces will do their best to push limits as far as they can.
