Fréderike Geerdink
SDF general commander Mazlum Abdi has welcomed the lifting of sanctions that US President Trump has announced. Of course, for the Kurds and for the Autonomous Administration, it is good news that the prospect of building up Syria again is slowly becoming a reality. At the same time, there is a risk: an economic takeover, undermining the gains Kurds have struggled so hard for.
Last month, I visited Syria for two weeks. I started my journey in Damascus, travelled to Aleppo and Raqqa by public bus and then proceeded further into SDF-controlled lands east of the Euphrates River. I must say that I felt safe, not in the least because I and the local Kurdish journalist I worked with avoided roads and checkpoints under the control of the SNA, the criminal militias backed by Turkey.
In the Damascus countryside, in Homs, in Aleppo and Raqqa, the extent of the destruction that the war has caused is still overwhelming. We saw ghost neighbourhoods with only skeletons of buildings remaining and with no people around but us. We saw parts of cities that had turned into wastelands: damaged buildings had been pulled down for security reasons and the rubble had been neatly scraped together into huge piles, but they lay desolate.
And that is only part of the destruction that needs to be rebuilt. Infrastructure, electricity networks, dams, you name it – where to begin, with an economy in total shatters and no budget whatsoever? With the sanctions lifted, plans can be made.
Revolutionary
Turkey is surely already wringing its hands. Erdoğan fully approved of HTS leader Jolani, formerly of Al-Qaeda and formerly of ISIS, toppling the Assad regime. Now, known by his real name al-Sharaa again and with an official status as interim president, Turkey is still firmly on his side. With investments from Gulf states and with Turkey’s huge and highly corrupt construction sector, there is money to be earned.
At first glance, this is good news for the Kurds. After all, if Turkey gets the chance to build entire neighbourhoods from scratch, it won’t wage a new war against Kurds. It is, however, not hard to imagine how a capitalist offensive can undermine the Kurdish revolutionary project in northeast Syria.
Turkey has been occupying Girê Spî (Tel Abyad) and Serekaniyê (Ras al-Ayn), formerly part of the Autonomous Administration and thriving, since 2019. The towns have rapidly been Turkified, even placed under the supervision of governors across the border in Turkey. Kurds have fled, their homes and lands confiscated. Further west, in Afrin, occupied by Turkey since 2018, the Kurdish population has largely been replaced by Arabs. Turkey is building homes and inviting Arabs to live there, hoping to permanently change the demographics of the once almost 100% Kurdish region.
Raqqa
Is this what would await the cities, towns and villages of the Autonomous Administration of northeast Syria? Well, not in the same way, obviously. As long as Turkey doesn’t enter with military forces – either with the Turkish army or its mercenaries of the SNA – the Kurds have no reason to flee for their lives. And as long as US troops remain in the country, Turkey won’t barge in. And even if the US leaves, Turkey might not want to embark on a costly military incursion again. But what if a capitalist occupation creeps up?
What if Turkey starts an economic incursion by offering to help further rebuild Raqqa? That predominantly Arab city was, to my happy astonishment, looking so much better already last month than it was the previous time I was there, in 2018. It still needs a lot of work though, and would it be realistic to refuse a Turkish ‘helping hand’? Would such an offer increase the pressure to hand over administrative control of the city to Damascus, an option that some say is on the table?
What if Turkey seizes the opportunity to ‘Turkify’ local economies, for example by broadening the availability of Turkish telecommunication networks, providing electricity, introducing Turkish brands (such as LC Waikiki in Kobani and Qamişlo)? What if it offers the possibility to work for Turkish companies, being paid in Turkish liras, which could then become an accepted currency? What if Turkey offers to repair the power stations and water infrastructure it destroyed, offering local workers good salaries and, with that, gaining sympathy?
Recognition
The risk for Turkey would be that it would backfire, of course. That it would only strengthen the Autonomous Administration instead of weakening it. It could reduce that risk by working via Damascus. That’s not a far-fetched scenario. After all, the Autonomous Administration lacks international recognition, and investors may opt to deal with Damascus only. Will the Autonomous Administration be strong enough to decline such aggressive economic policies? Also, if it means that the rest of Syria is recovering from the war and becomes more prosperous than the northeast? Would the population accept that?
It’s all rather speculative, I know. But in the back of my head is the experience of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq (KRI). Turkey vehemently opposed that autonomy, until it saw and seized the opportunity to politically subdue the Kurdish leaders with an offensive economic policy. Those leaders were corrupt and lacked a spine, which made implementation of the plan rather easy. The Kurdish leaders in Rojava are no ruthless capitalists and they do have a spine, but again, they lack the international recognition that the Kurdistan Region in Iraq had gained, which may make it harder to stay in control of the economy.
Sovereignty
Rojava has oil, like the KRI, which is an asset if used well. The KRI could only export independent of Baghdad via Turkey, which made them even more dependent on the northern aggressor, while Rojava has been trading with Damascus and continues to do so. Until Damascus claims legal sovereignty over all Syrian oil, including that in Rojava.
When Assad fell, the fear that Rojava would fall soon was real. It didn’t happen, and actually, the Kurdish position isn’t so weak at all. But now, with the sanctions lifted, an economic takeover, with the risk of demographic change with returning Syrian refugees from Turkey, economic occupation may be on Erdoğan’s mind. Let’s see what the strong and smart leadership of northeast Syria has up its sleeve to counter that.
Fréderike Geerdink is an independent journalist. Follow her on Bluesky (or X) or subscribe to her acclaimed weekly newsletter Expert Kurdistan.
