From a rare handshake in parliament to a mass funeral attended across political divides, and from secretive party congresses to a power shift in Syria, a dramatic political realignment is under way in Turkey—centred on law, legitimacy, and the unresolved Kurdish question.
Between mid-April and early May 2025, a series of rapid and at times contradictory developments have brought the Kurdish issue back to the centre of Turkey’s domestic and regional agenda. The process, triggered by a public disarmament call from imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan, may mark the most serious attempt at a negotiated solution since the collapse of the 2013–15 peace talks.
Öcalan’s 27 February statement, read out by a delegation at a press conference in İstanbul, called on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to dissolve itself and transition to legal-political methods. Describing the organisation’s mission as complete, Öcalan proposed a new framework based on democratic reform and societal reconciliation. The message followed a series of state-authorised meetings with the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party politicians and marked the first public communication from Öcalan in years.
The period that followed was marked by both symbolic gestures and political turbulence. The death of Sırrı Süreyya Önder—a DEM Party MP and a key figure in both past and ongoing peace efforts—on 3 May was widely seen as a symbolic loss for the broader movement. His funeral drew senior figures from across the political spectrum, including government ministers and opposition leaders. Devlet Bahçeli, leader of the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and coalition partner to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, offered condolences and renewed his call for the PKK to disarm—reaffirming the political overture he had made months earlier with a surprise handshake extended to DEM Party MPs in October 2024.
In neighbouring Syria, the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the rise of an Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led administration ushered in a period of renewed instability. The non-conflict agreement signed on 10 March 2025 between HTS, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa (al-Julani), and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), led by Mazloum Abdi, was broadly welcomed, including by Kurdish communities, as a step toward preventing further clashes and fostering stability. However, HTS faced widespread condemnation for its actions in coastal regions like Latakia and Tartus, where reports of massacres and forced displacement of Alawite communities sparked outrage.
Domestically, the political atmosphere in Turkey remained tense. On 20 March, İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu was arrested on charges related to corruption and alleged ties to terrorism, prompting mass protests and renewed concerns over the independence of Turkey’s judiciary.
The most significant development came on 9 May, when the PKK announced it had held its 12th congress in the ‘Medya Defence Zones’*. The group stated that “historic decisions” had been made in line with Öcalan’s call, though the specifics were not made public. The congress also honoured the late Sırrı Süreyya Önder for his role in initiating the process.
Government officials welcomed the announcement cautiously. Ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) spokesperson Ömer Çelik described the process as a “strategic step” that could undermine “imperialist proxy wars” in the region, and suggested that further political reforms could follow if the PKK disarms.
However, observers warn that the process remains fragile. Human rights groups and legal experts have called for the repeal of sweeping anti-terror legislation and for equal treatment of political prisoners. The DEM Party has reiterated demands for legal guarantees, cultural rights, and the restoration of elected local governments in Kurdish-majority municipalities currently run by state-appointed trustees.
What began as a tentative shift in tone inside Turkey’s parliament has evolved into a wider political and geopolitical process. Whether it results in long-term peace or breaks down under pressure will depend not only on the PKK’s next move—but also on whether the Turkish state is willing to match political overtures with legal and institutional change.
(*) The Medya Defence Zones refer to a mountainous region in northern Iraq, primarily within the Kurdistan Region, that serves as the main stronghold of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). This area encompasses parts of the Qandil Mountains and includes regions such as Zap, Metina, Avaşîn and Garê. The term “Medya Defence Zones” is used by the PKK to denote areas under its control, which it considers liberated or autonomous from Turkish state authority.
TIMELINE OF TURKEY’S RECENT KURDISH PEACE TALKS
1 October 2024 – Bahçeli’s unexpected gesture:
MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli shakes hands with DEM Party MPs during the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. He states: “If we’re seeking peace abroad, why not seek it at home?”
3 October 2024 – Erdoğan visits Bahçeli:
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan visits Bahçeli, indicating support for the handshake and calling for expanded dialogue.
13 October 2024 – Freedom rally blocked:
The DEM Party’s “Freedom Rally” in Diyarbakır (Amed), protesting Öcalan’s isolation, is prevented by security forces.
22 October 2024 – Bahçeli invites Öcalan to speak:
Bahçeli publicly suggests that if Öcalan calls for the PKK’s dissolution, he should be allowed to do so from the DEM Party’s podium in parliament. He also introduces the idea of a “right to hope” (legal reforms that could allow release after life imprisonment).
24 October 2024 – First İmralı meeting in years:
Öcalan meets with his nephew, DEM Party MP Ömer Öcalan, for the first time in nearly five years. He says he is ready to help move from armed conflict to legal politics.
27 February 2024 – Call for peace announced:
The İmralı delegation shares Öcalan’s “Call for Peace and Democratic Society”, urging the PKK to dissolve and embrace democratic politics. Public squares in Diyarbakır (Amed) and Van (Wan) broadcast the message live.
1 March 2025 – PKK ceasefire declared:
The PKK declares a unilateral ceasefire and announces it is preparing to convene its congress in response to Öcalan’s call.
3 March 2025 – Bahçeli calls DEM Party leaders:
Bahçeli contacts DEM Party Co-Chairs Tuncer Bakırhan and Pervin Buldan, and Sırrı Süreyya Önder, thanking them for their role and promising: “We will democratise this country together.”
15 April 2025 – Sırrı Süreyya Önder hospitalised:
Deputy Speaker and DEM MP Önder is admitted with a serious heart condition. Scheduled political meetings are postponed.
21 April – Öcalan meeting at İmralı:
DEM Party MP Pervin Buldan and Asrın Law Office lawyer Faik Özgür Erol meet with Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island.
23 April – Symbolic parliamentary attendance and Kurdish unity talks:
DEM Party co-chairs attend Republic Day reception at the Grand National Assembly—first time since 2014. Simultaneously, Nechirvan Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and SDF commander Mazloum Abdi meet in Erbil (Hewlêr) to discuss Syrian Kurdish unity.
25–26 April – Rojava conference and Kurdish delegation:
A major Kurdish Unity Conference is held in North and East Syria. Kurdish politicians from all parts of Kurdistan attend.
3 May – Death of Sırrı Süreyya Önder:
Önder dies in hospital. His death later becomes symbolically linked to the peace process.
4 May – Önder’s funeral:
Large turnout from across the political spectrum. Government and opposition figures attend, including main opposition CHP leader Özgür Özel.
5 May – AKP calls for PKK decision:
Party spokesperson Ömer Çelik says a decision on disarmament is expected from the PKK “within days”.
7 May – Bahçeli returns to parliament:
MHP leader makes his first public appearance in two months, offering condolences to DEM Party officials and Önder’s family.
9 May – PKK 12th Congress held:
The PKK announces it convened its congress between 5–7 May in two locations and made “historic decisions” based on Öcalan’s February peace call. Details remain forthcoming.
