The escalating war between Israel and Iran is creating multiple layers of risk for Turkey, threatening President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s domestic political strategy and regional ambitions, according to Gönül Tol, director of the Turkey programme at the Middle East Institute.
In an analysis published on Friday, Tol writes that Ankara’s early signals of quiet relief at the weakening of Iranian proxies have given way to alarm, as the war expands into a wider conflict that could destabilise Turkey’s borders, economy and diplomacy. “The conflict presents both immediate threats and long-term strategic risks for Turkey,” she argues.
According to Tol, the most immediate casualty may be Erdoğan’s economic programme. Turkey’s economy remains dependent on energy imports, and the war has already led to a surge in oil and gas prices. Although global crude prices have cooled slightly, Tol notes that the cost per barrel—hovering above $74—is still high enough to threaten inflation targets and widen the current account deficit. She added that Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which Turkey receives imports from Iraq, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
The risk is not just theoretical. Tol reports that an Israeli airstrike on 14 June damaged facilities at Iran’s South Pars gas field, which supplies roughly 16% of Turkey’s annual gas demand. Production was temporarily halted, and Tol warns that sanctions could hinder repairs, potentially leading to longer-term supply disruptions. “Any prolonged disruption would leave Turkey exposed to gas shortages or price spikes,” she writes.
The impact of rising global energy prices is already being felt by Turkish consumers. In the week following the escalation of the Israel–Iran war, fuel prices in Turkey surged sharply. As of 21 June, the price of diesel exceeded 55 Turkish lira per litre in Ankara, while petrol rose above 52 lira. According to local reports, diesel prices have increased by 8.5 lira and petrol by 4.5 lira in just one week. These rapid price hikes have heightened public frustration and added new urgency to Erdoğan’s efforts to contain inflation—an issue Gönül Tol identifies as a central pressure point in her assessment of Turkey’s economic fragility.
Tol also draws attention to the political risks posed by inflation and energy insecurity. Following a sharp rise in interest rates earlier this year to control inflation, Turkey’s central bank is now under pressure to loosen monetary policy. But Tol cautions that doing so in the current context could backfire, as investor confidence wavers amid geopolitical turmoil.
In addition to economic threats, Tol sees growing security concerns along Turkey’s eastern border. She notes that Ankara has increased surveillance and tightened security following reports of Iranian civilians crossing into Turkey. Although the government has denied the likelihood of a new refugee wave, opposition media and analysts have raised alarms. Tol situates these fears within a broader context: a decade of pressure from hosting nearly four million Syrian refugees.
These tensions come at a politically sensitive moment for Erdoğan, whose government has recently initiated peace talks with the Kurdish movement. According to Tol, the talks led to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s surprise decision to disarm and disband—a move she interprets as an attempt to secure the support of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party in parliament and to extend Erdoğan’s political future. However, Tol warns that instability in Iran could revive the armed activities of the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), widely regarded as the group’s Iranian wing, which has remained largely inactive since 2011. She sees this as a direct threat to Erdoğan’s reconciliation strategy.
Tol is also sharply critical of the risks facing Turkey’s foreign policy realignment. In recent years, Ankara has sought to reverse its regional isolation by mending ties with Gulf states, re-engaging with Washington, and rebuilding relations with Israel. But Tol argues that the Israel–Iran war may derail that shift.
A particular point of contention, she writes, is the NATO early-warning radar system in Kürecik, in southeastern Turkey. While Turkish officials insist the radar operates only under NATO command and does not share data with individual members, including Israel, Tol notes that both Iranian officials and Turkish opposition figures have questioned whether the base played a role in recent interceptions of Iranian drones and missiles.
According to Tol, Iran has long viewed Kürecik as a symbol of Turkey’s alignment with Western—particularly American and Israeli—interests. She cites repeated Iranian threats that the radar site would be among the first targets in the event of war. “Continued operation of Kürecik could not only deepen domestic backlash but also increase the likelihood of Iran viewing Turkey as a legitimate military target,” Tol warns.
Tol concludes that beyond short-term instability, the greatest risk to Turkey lies in the potential collapse of the Iranian state. She argues that Israeli officials have signalled an ambition not only to weaken Iran’s nuclear programme, but to destabilise the regime itself. With no viable opposition prepared to fill the vacuum, Tol suggests that Iran could slide towards state failure—adding another source of instability on Turkey’s already strained border, alongside Syria and Iraq.
While Tol’s analysis concentrates on the structural vulnerabilities confronting the Turkish state—economic, diplomatic and security-related—some Kurdish analysts have offered a political vision for navigating the crisis. Journalist Selahattin Soro, for instance, describes the Israel–Iran war as part of a broader imperial strategy aimed at reshaping the Middle East and warns that Turkey could become the next target if it fails to pursue democratic reform. In his view, embracing domestic reconciliation—particularly through renewed dialogue with Kurdish actors—offers not only a path to internal stability but a strategic shield against external entanglement.
