Fréderike Geerdink
Has Kobani fallen? The question pounded into my head when I woke up in the middle of the night earlier this week. I grabbed my phone and checked: No, Kobani had not fallen into the hands of Turkey’s brutal Syrian National Army (SNA) mercenaries. Of course, my thoughts quickly went back to the fall of 2014, when ISIS was besieging the Kurdish city. Then too I woke up with that urgent thought, sighing with relief upon learning that Kobani (Kobanê) was still standing. Will Kobani remain standing proudly as a symbol of Kurdish resistance this time?
To be honest, I am very worried. Turkey and its SNA mercenaries want Kobani and the whole of North and East Syria, controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and it’s not likely that the US will stop them. The US said that it ‘remains committed to the fight against ISIS’, which is something entirely different from being committed to protecting Kurdish gains since 2012, saving Kurdish lives and the autonomy of Rojava (Kurdistan in Syria). The SDF is, of course, well aware of this. They too have always said that their cooperation with the US is a tactical one aimed at eliminating ISIS, not a strategic partnership. This is why they have always insisted on official status for their autonomy, to decrease dependence on US presence on the ground.
Boots on the ground
When the cooperation between the Kurdish fighters and the US was forged, back in 2014, the US had been looking for boots on the ground in the fight against ISIS. Turkey couldn’t do it, partly because their mercenaries in Syria were an undisciplined and disorganised bunch of jihadists. But the Kurds could. The People’s Protection Units (YPG) and Women’s Protection Units (YPJ) were resisting ISIS’s siege of Kobani, and were doing so so incredibly well, that the US teamed up with them. The US bombed ISIS in Kobani to smithereens, while the YPG and the YPJ defended the city on the ground. Then the SDF was founded, lead by the YPG/YPJ, and the rest is history: ISIS was territorially defeated in 2019.
Ever since, the SDF has continued to fight ISIS, in cooperation with the US-led International Coalition against ISIS. The SDF guards camps and prisons where ISIS members are held, eliminates sleeper cells and prevents attacks. But now that Assad is gone, the US may want to look elsewhere to team up against ISIS. To… Turkey, for example.
Jihadist roots
Like Turkey’s mercenaries in 2014, the SNA, which is part of the initiative led by Hay’at Tahrir al Sham (HTS) that toppled Assad, are disorganised criminals. But the dynamic has changed. Turkey is not at odds with the Syrian government any more. HTS, which is leading Syria’s transitional administration, has Turkey’s full support. What if a new Syrian government, friendly with Turkey, could keep ISIS in check, at least theoretically? Then the US would be able to leave Syria. That HTS may turn out not to have broken with their jihadist roots and that the SNA are war criminals fully backed by Turkey, don’t really matter to the US. As long as the jihadists don’t carry out attacks on US and European soil, all is fine because lives in the Middle-East don’t matter to the white west.
But, I hear you say, the US is talking to Turkey to tell it to leave the Autonomous Administration east of the Euphrates alone, right? They pressurised the SDF to withdraw from Manbij (Minbîc) and added that if SDF wouldn’t do that, the US wouldn’t protect them east of the Euphrates, right? True, but it means nothing on the ground. If the SNA attacks Kobani and then advances further east to Qamishli (Qamişlo), Derik (Dêrik) and other Kurdish cities and villages, what are the US going to do? Defend the Kurds and get in trouble with Turkey? It’s more likely they will make some oil deal with Turkey relating to the natural resources in lands now controlled by the SDF. Again, Kurdish lives don’t matter.
If Kurdish cities close to the border fall into SNA hands, the SDF can forget about holding on to cities somewhat further from the border, like Raqqa, Hasakah (Hesekê) and Deir ez-Zor (Dêrazor). They kicked ISIS out of those cities and did their best to implement their grass-roots democracy project there by giving the locals the lead in the administration, but, in Deir ez-Zor in particular it has been difficult to keep the loyalty of the Arab tribes. The chance of it falling apart when the core of Rojava, Kurdistan in Syria, has been crushed, is near total, I’m afraid.
Assorted militias
Let me take you back to 2019. Turkey wanted to invade SDF lands, citing ‘terrorism’. The SDF is not and never has been a military threat to Turkey, but nevertheless, the US urged the SDF to withdraw heavy weapons from parts of the border so Turkey would feel safer. The US vowed the Kurds would be safe. So the SDF removed weapons from the border around Ras al-Ayn (Serêkaniyê) and Tel Abyad (Girê Spî), and what happened? Turkey invaded and occupied Serêkaniyê and Tel Abyad. The occupation was accompanied by ethnic cleansing of the Kurdish population of those towns. Like in Afrin, northwest Syria, there was infighting among the assorted militias of the SNA, endangering everyday life, and they resorted to torture and the kidnapping of Kurds, looting and the confiscation of property. The so-called ‘safe zone’ became a danger zone.
This tells you what will happen when the SNA and Turkey invade North and East Syria. It will also show HTS’s true colours. My prediction: Their commitment to diversity is lip-service. They may add a Kurd who is a puppet of Turkey to their administration in some irrelevant post, but that will be it.
Ultimate chance
How imminent is the danger? Very, I think. Turkey’s foreign minister and former spy chief Hakan Fidan said on Turkish TV that ‘foreign leaders’ of the YPG should leave Syria by Saturday (this weekend) and that Syrians in the YPG should put down their weapons. These demands, with which the YPG/SDF won’t comply, could be part of a negotiation that the US is conducting between the SDF and Turkey, but Turkey has no reason to weaken its stance. It has made clear what it wants for many years – the eradication of the Kurdish revolutionary movement – and it sees the ultimate chance to realise it now
Turkey’s phrasing, ‘foreign leaders’, is interesting, by the way, and confirms Turkey’s denial of the existence of Kurdistan: None of the Kurdish leadership of the YPG or the YPJ is ‘foreign’, because Kurds are in their homeland anywhere in Kurdistan. The SNA, on the other hand, is full of foreign fighters, like Uzbeks, Tajiks, Uyghurs, Azeris and Turks. Turkey doesn’t see Turks fighting in Syria as foreigners because they consider those lands historically Turkish. Erdoğan’s Ottoman dream.
Turkey won’t act instantly when this weekend’s ultimatum passes without the SDF complying. It is trying to get the Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan, jailed on Imralı Island since 1999, on board. The Peoples’ Equality and Democracy (DEM) Party, a leftist party rooted in the Kurdish political movement, has filed a request to visit Öcalan, who has been in near total isolation for many years, and preparations for this visit are reportedly underway now. They (it’s unclear who exactly ‘they’ is, but the government has the keys of the boat to Imralı of course) are now discussing what Öcalan should say for such a visit to happen.
House arrest
We know already what Turkey wants Öcalan to say. He is supposed to announce the dissolution of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and demand that the YPG and the YPJ drop their weapons. This much has been made clear by the coalition partner of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), who think Öcalan can be lured into saying things in exchange for more freedom or even house arrest. But Öcalan isn’t in it for himself, he’s in it for the people. And if there is one thing he believes in, it’s self-defence, the right to which he will never deny his own people.
Maybe the DEM Party visit to Imralı will happen. Öcalan never speaks in straightforward sentences, and he might repeat words he has uttered so very often: ‘The time for armed struggle is over and it is time to start negotiations’. The Turkish media will misrepresent his words and tell the public that it’s a call to lay down weapons, while those holding the weapons will insist on the right to self-defence which they know Öcalan holds sacred. The state will blame the Kurdish movement for the ‘failure’ of this ‘initiative’, and invade Syrian lands once again. The US will look the other way as war crimes unfold.
I hope I’m wrong. I hope the statue of Arin Mirkan, the incredibly brave fighter who blew herself up on Mistenur Hill in Kobani in 2014 to thwart an ISIS offensive and who contributed significantly to the Kurds’ victory, will stand tall on Kobani’s central square for years to come.
Fréderike Geerdink is an independent journalist. Follow her on Bluesky (or X) or subscribe to her acclaimed weekly newsletter Expert Kurdistan.
